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Abstract: 
Enlargement is the most important foreign policy tool of the European Union. Beyond changing 
the geographical borders of the Union, enlargement also concerns EU’s self-other relations, 
bringing to the fore the definitions of “European” space, values and norms. Recent, critical 
approaches to European and EU studies have called scholars to pay attention to the colonial roots 
of the EU, arguing that EU as an agent in the global arena and its neighbourhood cannot be 
understood outside or separate from colonial discourses. Drawing from this perspective as well as 
from the rich literature on the Europe’s historical relation to East and the current accession states 
in the Balkans, this thesis asks (how) is the EU’s enlargement policy postcolonial. 
To explore, understand and critically assess the normative assumptions that are embedded in 
enlargement policies, this thesis uses post-structuralist discourse theory (PDT) and the logics 
approach by Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007) that offers a more specific application of the 
PDT in empirical analysis. The analysis approaches four most recent EU enlargement policy papers 
from three angles: what is taken as granted (social logic), what is challenged or institutionalized 
(political logic) and how the policies are argued for (fantasmatic logic).  
The analysis in this thesis brings the postcolonial theoretical concepts into the context of 
enlargement policies and demonstrates the diversity of the forms in which colonialist assumptions 
in enlargement policy can play out in practice. Enlargement and the EU’s relation to the Balkans 
emerges from the material as paradoxical and contradictory, producing ambivalence on the 
Western Balkan’s standing in relation to Europe through a discursive double move of simultaneous 
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Enlargement is -- best viewed not so much as a series of discrete events but rather as 
an ongoing policy issue and policy process. It is an issue and process that is, 
moreover, quite unlike any other. This is so because enlargement raises fundamental 
questions about the very nature and direction of European integration. 
 (Nugent, 2017, p. 213) 
 
Enlargement is the most successful and important foreign policy tool of the European Union (EU) 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002).  The EU—and its predecessor, the European Community 
(EC)—has been expanding geographically throughout its history. Ever since the first member 
application by the United Kingdom in 1961, there has not been a time that the EC/EU has not 
discussed questions of further enlargement (Nugent, 2017).  The end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Central-Eastern European (CEE) communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 
1990s opened a possibility to eastward enlargement and the “re-unification” of Europe, a project 
that had been the goal of the proponents of European integration since the end of the Second 
World War (Nugent, 2004; Raunio & Tiilikainen, 2002). Consequently, the past thirty years have 
marked enlargement in a previously unseen scale, from 12 to 27 members.  The so-called “Big 
Bang” or “Eastern” enlargement of 2004 and 2007 was particularly momentous, bringing in twelve 
new members1 and changing radically the political, economic, and geographical composition of 
the Union.   
 
At the time, Eastern enlargement was celebrated as another success of the “European project” in 
overcoming and healing the past Cold War divisions (European Union, 2020; Hülsse, 2006). Indeed, 
enlargement is often framed as EU’s historical duty to protect and promote European peace, 
values and way of life. The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the failure to prevent 
bloodshed in the Balkans provided the EU with another such duty, tying the countries in the region 
to the sequel of European peace project. The Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
 
1 1 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 2007: 
Bulgaria and Romania 
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communicated this sense of obligation well in one of his speeches during Denmark’s presidency of 
the Council of the European Union: 
 
Just as we thought that nationalism, aggression and war had become unthinkable in 
Europe, we became witnesses to the brutal conflicts in the Balkans. This 
demonstrated that lasting peace in Europe would only come about through the 
unification of Europe. Now we must deliver on the promises. We have a historic and 
moral obligation to seize the present opportunity to consolidate peace and create 
the basis for progress across the entire continent. (Rasmussen, 2002)  
 
If European integration is the grand narrative of the EU, when is this historical responsibility 
fulfilled, or when is European integration finished? The future of the EU enlargement is an 
important part of the future of the EU; the enlargement policies of today defines possibilities of 
tomorrow.  Thus, imagining the future of the EU is crucial to enlargement politics and policies. 
These imaginaries, projected to enlargement, are both constituted and constitutive (Mische, 
2009).This means that they reflect our present understandings of what is or what should be 
Europe/EU, but also create the shape the future realities.   
 
Enlargement politics has never been only about the geographical borders of the Union. It has 
rather been an arena where the very definitions of what is European (and what is not) are 
negotiated. This is why enlargement politics and policies should always be understood in the wider 
context of EU’s self-understanding and self-other relations. Discussion on enlargement policies 
should always ask what are the imaginaries that these discussions are based on and how are the 
definitions of Europe and European are justified.  This thesis dives into these grounds by asking 
what are the normative assumptions that EU’s enlargement policies are built on. The focus here is 
on the ongoing accession process of the so-called Western Balkan six (WB6)2: Serbia, Montenegro, 
North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo. I will first provide a background for the current 
situation in enlargement politics and then move on to introduce the research problem and aim of 
the thesis.   
 
2 “Western Balkan six” is a term coined in 2014 when the leaders of the countries met in Berlin to launch the “Western 
Balkans six initiative” or the “Berlin process” that aims to support the accession process of the countries. The term has 
ever since been used especially by the EU institutions to refer to the six accession countries   
 5 
1.1 Recent developments in enlargement politics 
 
After the Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the emphasis of EU’s enlargement agenda has 
been to advance the negotiations with the “last corner” of Europe, Western Balkans.  Countries of 
the region were promised the “unequivocal support to the European perspective” in Thessaloniki 
summit of 2003 (European Commission, 2003), but the accession process has ever since been 
slow, hindered by both internal crisis of the Union and the candidate countries’ struggle to meet 
the accession criteria. Although the accession of Croatia in 2013 as well as the Prespa agreement 
(2018) that ended the historical name dispute between North Macedonia and Greece have given 
some glimmer of hope for further progress, 2010s in enlargement politics was shadowed by 
enlargement “fatigue” and lack of political will to push enlargement forward. Successive 
postponements and overall lagging of the accession process have also demoralized the WB6 
countries in their efforts to make the required reforms. It seems that much of the enthusiasm and 
optimism of the early 2000s has vanished - some have even described the situation as the “crisis” 
of the enlargement (Sekulić, 2020). 
 
Dissent and confusion around enlargement are well manifested in recent attempts by the EU to 
open negotiations with candidate countries Albania and North Macedonia. The two countries 
were supposed to receive the formal candidate status already in October 2019, but the decision 
was vetoed by France in late 2019, backed up by the Netherlands and Denmark. The French 
president Emmanuel Macron referred to disputes between “visions” and called for reforms in 
enlargement rules (BBC, 2019). Macron’s move received controversial responses and frustration 
from the WB6 countries. Many representatives of the EU establishment also criticized it heavily, 
including Commission chief Jean-Claude Juncker who called it “a major historic mistake”, EU 
Council President Donald Tusk who “felt embarrassed” by this “mistake” and German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel who was “disappointed” of France’s decision (ibid.). 
 
Altogether, the discussions that triggered the French veto and its aftermath highlighted a lack 
common objective amongst the Member States and EU institutions regarding enlargement policy. 
While different interests and issues that affect enlargement policy are deeply entangled, there are 
some main tensions that linger behind current debates. First, as argued by France in its 
justifications for the veto, there is a fear of accepting “unprepared” new members that could 
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hamper decision-making and challenge core European values, such as democracy and the rule of 
law. This is highlighted by recent experiences with countries such as Hungary and Poland that have 
revealed the EU’s inability to intervene in intra-state affairs after accession (Kelemen, 2020). Thus, 
the French veto can be seen as signaling the anxiety of losing control or discipline over candidate 
countries that could potentially ally with those EU members that challenge certain (western) 
understandings of European values and norms. Moreover, there is a fear that a growing number of 
member states will make the decision-making ever more complicated, hindered by national 
interests and bilateral disputes. This is particularly worrying for countries such as France that push 
for the deepening of the integration, especially after Brexit (Eisl, 2019) .  
 
On the other hand, alternative voices, most importantly the new, “geopolitical” European 
Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen seem to push for a firmer grip on the WB6 countries. 
Over the past years, Brussels has gradually become aware of the geostrategic importance of the 
region and the increasing influence of rival powers such as Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf 
states in the region (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021). Although the concrete influence these actors have 
achieved remains small compared to that of the EU, the realization of increasing competition and 
the fear of losing dominance has shifted the tone of enlargement debates. (Koppa, 2020; Markovic 
Khaze & Wang, 2020; Panagiotou, 2020). This is particularly true for the Commission that looks 
enlargement politics from the perspective of Union’s global role and agency. The feeling of 
urgency can be sensed from the State of the Union address by former President Juncker at the 
European Parliament:    
 
Europe can export stability, as we have done with the successive enlargements of 
our Union. For me, these are and will remain success stories – for we were able to 
reconcile Europe's history and geography. But there is more to be done. We must 
find unity when it comes to the Western Balkans – once and for all. Should we not, 
our immediate neighbourhood will be shaped by others. (European Commission, 
2018b)  
 
Thus, it seems that while enlargement has sustained its importance as a foreign policy of the 
Union, the arguments behind enlargement agenda are diverse and constantly on the move due to 
both internal debates of the EU and the changing geopolitical situation. It could be argued that the 
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definitive question of the borders of Europe has shifted from who is European (enough) towards 
who benefits Europe.  
 
As a response to the French veto, the European Commission introduced a new enlargement 
methodology called “Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western 
Balkans” in February 2020 (European Commission, 2020a). The principles of the new methodology 
follow a proposal, or a “non-paper” drafted by France in November 20193. In public, 
commentators have interpreted the new methodology as an attempt to re-assure both the 
candidate countries by providing a more concrete and predictable framework, and the 
(western) Member States by adding the possibility to sanction candidates for “any serious or 
prolonged stagnation or backsliding” in the process (BBC, 2019). However, despite every effort, 
the accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania remain to be started due to bilateral 
disputes between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. 
 
1.2 Research problem and the aim of the thesis  
 
Continuous challenges in decision-making and the lack of progress in accession talks begs the 
question of whether there is a shared vision of enlargement. To understand where the EU is 
heading, we need better insight on how the EU institutions see themselves, their role and the 
future of Europe. More specifically, to evaluate and assess these perceptions, we need to ask what 
are the underlying normative assumptions that EU policies are built on. After all, policies do not 
appear from thin air but are always rooted in particular interpretations of the current situation in 
which certain aspects are seen as problematic and some others as desirable (Bacchi, 2009). 
 
Recent studies on European integration and European identity have raised questions about the 
colonialist and imperialist aspects of the European project, calling researchers to pay more 
attention to the colonialist roots of the EU and European integration (Hansen & Jonsson, 2014; 
Jansen, 2010; Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013; Pasture, 2018). From this postcolonial4 perspective, the EU 
 
3 France’s non-paper “Reforming the European Union accession process” available at : https://www.politico.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/Enlargement-nonpaper.pdf  
4 The terminology of post-, neo-,(post) or postcolonial has been widely debated amongst postcolonial theorists, as 
some interpret the prefix “post-“ is misleading in assuming that periods of “colonialism” and “post-colonialism” can be 
neatly separated. (Ashcroft et al., 2013, pp. 204–209). In this thesis, I use the term “postcolonial” in referring to the 
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as a regional and global actor should be critically assessed through the legacy of Western 
colonialism and its continuous impact in today’s societies and international relations. Building on 
current postcolonial theory and research on the EU, the starting point of this thesis is the 
understanding of the EU as a power operating in postcolonial space. The aim of this thesis is to 
answer the following research question: (how) is the enlargement policy of the European Union 
postcolonial?  
 
In this thesis, I approach EU enlargement policy as a site of political competition and compromise 
where different understandings of Europe, Europeanness and the future of the integration are 
negotiated. My aim is to conduct a critical analysis of the enlargement policy discourse to shed 
light to the very assumptions these policies are built on.  I will focus solely on the ‘official’ or 
institutional enlargement discourses by the EU, articulated in enlargement policy documents that 
set the agenda and guide decision-making in enlargement politics. The research task can be 
understood as two-fold. First, the aim is to de-construct enlargement policy discourse in order to 
describe the underlying assumptions of enlargement politics, and secondly, to critically assess 
these assumptions through postcolonial theory and concepts. 
 
The first part of the research task, de-construction, is conducted through post-structuralist 
discourse analysis. The theoretical premises and methodological choices of this thesis are based 
on Political Discourse Theory (PDT), a post-structuralist approach developed notably by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their 1985 book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). More specifically, the ontological and 
epistemological premises, as well as the empirical analysis, follow the Logics of Critical 
Explanation, by Jason Glynos and David Horwath (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, 2008). While putting in 
motion its own way of explanation in social science, the logics approach builds 
on Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theoretical foundation, sharing their basic ontology, premises, and 
motivations. In short, this means that social structures - such as the enlargement policy- are seen 
as discursive and radically contingent. Discourse is understood as productive, and constitutive for 
social relations and reality. The meaning of (policy) articulation, then, is extended from mere 
descriptions or reactions of the social reality to constitutive acts of power. The contingency of 
 
impact of colonialism and colonial structures and mentalities in today’s Europe and the research that looks into them. 
In addition, I will be using “neocolonial” in referring to contemporary or novel forms and structures of colonialism. 
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discourse means that meanings are never fixed but remain open; they can be always contested 
and re-defined. Thus, enlargement politics can be seen as a site of articulatory struggle between 
different stakeholders over constituting the meanings of enlargement. The research task is to de-
construct or unpack these meanings. For the purposes of this thesis, the strength of the logics 
approach is that it does not only allow for (critically) describing the existing discourse, but also 
asks how discourses are sedimented or challenged and argued for. This way, it is possible to assess 
the normative background of the enlargement discourse by analysing what is problemitised, what 
has been left untouched and how these decisions are argued for (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; 
Howarth et al., 2016).  
 
Recent research has shown that enlargement policy, a meeting point of foreign policy and self-
determination, offers a uniquely interesting viewpoint to Europeanness and its Others, linking 
enlargement policy to the wider question of European identity vis-á-vis the “rest” and in this case 
particularly the “East” (Case, 2009; Hülsse, 2006; Kølvraa, 2016, 2018). By critically exploring the 
normative background of enlargement politics, this thesis aims to contribute to the postcolonial 
theory’s agenda proposed by Nora Onar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2013). This means de-
centring Europe in recearch through challenging Eurocentrism (provincializing), 
engaging alternative perspectives, and recognizing historical patterns underpinning EU 
enlargement policy (ibid.). Paying special attention to the long history of constructing European 
“Self” against the Balkan “Other” and discussing its implications to the enlargement project, this 
thesis also contributes to the tradition of the critique of Balkanism and Balkanising mentalities 
(Petrović, 2014; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; Todorova, 1997). In practice, this means that the de-
constructed enlargement discourse is critically assessed through the concepts of postcolonial 
theories.  
 
While two parts of the research task (de-construction and postcolonial critique) are here 
separately introduced for analytical purposes, they are overlapping in practice. Loyal to the spirit 
of post-structuralist discourse analysis and an interpretative approach to social science, the whole 
research process is understood as an open and abductive practice, where the investigation begins 
from certain theoretical concepts that can be adjusted through empirical observations. This way, 
the researcher moves back and forth between theoretical and methodological realms.   
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For fresh insight, my analysis will focus on comparing the most recent enlargement policy papers 
by the European Commission (EC): 2018 enlargement strategy (European Commission, 2018a) 
the new, “revised” enlargement methodology (European Commission, 2020a) and two of the most 
recent5 yearly “enlargement packages” (European Commission, 2019, 2020b) that explain 
Commission’s enlargement policy and take stock of the progress in each candidate country. A 
moment of publicly proclaimed change, such as the revision of the EU accession process in 2019-
2020, can be particularly revealing of the normative framework because it enables to observe not 
only what has been changed but also what has been left unquestioned, that is, what is taken for 
granted in enlargement politics. According to logics approach, studying such a moment of public 
contestation reveals if the contestation only concerns the surface or substantial issues of the given 
discourse or whether the very foundations of the discourse are questioned (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). 
 
While EU’s enlargement policy and the of EU as an actor in global politics have been extensively 
studied from a variety of perspectives, my experience is that too little attention has been given to 
the (normative) assumptions that enlargement policies are built on. The enlargement discourse is 
consistently on the move and its understanding requires constant attention. Currently only few 
analyses on the new enlargement methodology have been published, focusing mainly on 
geopolitics and the political bargaining around the French veto (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021). This 
thesis aims to answer to this deficit by providing a timely analysis of the most recent articulations 
of enlargement discourse.  
 
Furthermore, although the collective past(s) and their role in forming European identities have 
been given a lot of attention, the projections of European futures, especially in the context of 
enlargement politics, remain to be largely unexplored. As noted by Ann Miche (2009), “to examine 
future projections is not to assume that they come true, but to explore the ways they deeply 
infuse social interaction, albeit in possibly contradictory and surprising ways” (p. 702). The 
application of logics approach is important in this regard, for it does not only describe the present 
of enlargement discourses but also considers what kind of future(s) they imagine. Thus, following 
Rainer Hülsse (2006), enlargement discourse is here understood as producing ”both political 
 
5 The enlargement package of 2021 was published on the verge of handing in this thesis, on 19 October. 
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decisions about enlargement and a certain understanding of the EU” dealing “with the future 
shape of the EU, its boundaries, criteria for membership and its relationship to its former and 
future others” (p. 405). 
 
The innovation in this thesis is to combine post-structuralist discourse analysis and postcolonialist 
critique in the study of EU enlargement policies. These traditions fit together well, as postcolonial 
theory highlights the importance of understanding the ways in which colonialism is socially 
produced and how colonialist discourses interact with material realities. 
 
This thesis begins with a chapter on EU enlargement politics as topic of research, introducing 
recent literature on European integration and EU enlargement and discussing how this thesis is 
positioned in relation to existing literature. Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical foundations of 
this thesis. It is divided in two parts: postcolonial theory and post-structuralist discourse analysis. 
This is followed by discussion on the methodology and introduction of the empirical data in 
chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the main findings of the analysis. Implications and possible 




2. EU enlargement  
 
2.1 Enlargement as an EU policy domain  
 
 According to the definition found on the webpage of the European Council, EU enlargement is 
“the process whereby countries join the European Union” once they have fulfilled the membership 
criteria (European Council, 2021). Although this type of technical and formal definition of 
enlargement is typical style of the EU, scholars tend to look enlargement from a wider perspective. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I adopt Juncos’ and Perez’s dualistic understanding of enlargement 
as both a process and a policy  (Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013). Enlargement as a 
process refers to the “gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and 
norms” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). This take mainly focuses on how the 
candidate countries adopt to the membership criteria. Enlargement as a policy, in turn, involves 
the “principles, goals, and instruments defined by the EU with the aim of incorporating new 
member states” (Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013). Thus, it draws attention to the EU 
and its different institutions as policymakers. Although both sides are significant and cannot be 
fully separated in practice, this thesis focuses on the latter in order to understand EU enlargement 
as a EU policy domain. This definition also allows to go beyond individual enlargement” events” 
and to approach enlargement as a continuum of practices, assumptions and norms (Nugent, 
2017). 
 
The EC/EU has gone through four rounds of enlargement: Northern6, Mediterranean7, EFTA8, and 
Eastern enlargements9. In addition, Croatia joined the EU in 2013. While each of these have 
changed the Union and tested its integrational abilities and flexibility in their own way, the Eastern 
enlargement of 2004 and 2007 is widely seen as the most significant and challenging for the Union 
(as well as for the candidates), bringing in most extensive changes to the composition of the 
Union, as well as changing the way the whole enlargement process is understood. (Juncos & 
Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013) Although the difficulties of the Eastern enlargement are often 
 
6 1973: Denmark, Ireland, UK 
7 1981: Greece; 1986: Portugal and Spain 
8 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden (EFTA refers to countries’ membership of the European Free Trade Area) 
9 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovania; 2007: 
Bulgaria and Romania 
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highlighted, many of the main challenges and characteristics of enlargement were there already 
during the earlier rounds. These are for example the asymmetrical power relationship between 
the EU and the candidate countries that has been evident from the beginning, and the fact that 
new members have always increased the variety of national interests that have to be reconciled.  
Thus, the EU has always had to react and accommodate new members with institutional changes 
such as the institutionalization of European Council or the Single European Act of qualified 
majority voting (ibid.). The growing number of member states has also affected to such things as 
the size of the Commission and the distribution of the seats in the European Parliament (EP). This 
way, enlargement has always been an interactive process, transforming both the candidate 
countries as well as the Union itself.   
 
After what (at the time) seemed like a successful transformation of the Central- Eastern European 
countries into liberal democracies through Eastern enlargement, the EU was confident that a 
similar formula could be repeated in the Western Balkans. The failure to intervene during the 
violent dissolution of Yugoslavia also provided a moral obligation for the EU to engage in the 
region in the early 2000s (Noutcheva, 2012). After the Western Balkan countries were given an” 
enlargement perspective” in Thessaloniki in 2003, their accession has put EU’s transformative 
power into continuous test. The conditions which the countries must fulfil do not only concern 
economic or democratic governance but the consolidation of statehood in the post-conflict region. 
This means both internally setting up a sovereign and legitimate governance and externally solving 
bilateral conflicts (ibid.).  
 
2.2 Processes and actors   
 
 According to the Article 49 of the treaty on European Union (TEU), any European state that 
respects and promotes the values of the EU can apply for membership (European Union, 2012). 
These values are: “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, -- pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men” (ibid.). In 
practice, however, becoming a member is a much more complicated process that evolves around 
the principle of conditionality. Political and economic conditionality for the membership were 
introduced in enlargement politics for the Eastern enlargement round in 1993. These so-called 
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Copenhagen criteria10 requires aspiring member countries to have stable democratic institutions, 
functioning market economy and the ability to adopt the EU’s acquis communautaire, the 
accumulating body of EU legislation (European Council, 1993). Conditionality is implemented in 
the 35 different chapters of the enlargement negotiations. The Commission monitors each 
candidate’s compliance with the accession criteria through the chapters and following the 
benchmarks set in different documents. (Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013, p. 230)11. 
Thus, the Commission together with the member states reserve unilaterally the right to estimate 
when the candidate countries meet the requirements. Experiences with the accession of Romania 
and Bulgaria—that were admitted membership albeit not fully meeting the criteria—have led 
member states to require stricter application of conditionality and more elaborate monitoring by 
the Commission. (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2019; Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013, p. 232). 
Novel conditions for the Western Balkan countries were also set in the new enlargement 
methodology (2020a) which introduced sanction mechanisms for stagnation or backsliding in 
converging with the accession criteria.   
 
Strict set of clear conditions has been understood on the EU’s side as supporting merit-based, 
individual progress of each candidate country as opposed to enlargement as a “political” decision. 
However, enlargement does not depend only on candidate countries’ performance. According to 
the Maastricht treaty (European Union, 1992) each member state and the European parliament 
must agree on any new members, meaning that any member state can use their veto power to 
block decisions on enlargement. This has sometimes led to member states using the accession 
process to promote their own interests, as in the case of Bulgaria on the opening of North 
Macedonia’s enlargement negotiations in 2020. The EU’s capacity to absorb new members has 
also become an increasingly politicised issue (Börzel et al., 2017). 
 
 
10 Copenhagen criteria:  
1. political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;  
2. economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces  
3. administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of 
membership. (European Council, 1993) 
11 For the Western Balkans, these are the stabilization and association agreements (SAAs), the European partnership 
agreements (EPAs), the Europe agreements and the Commission’s annual reports (enlargement packages) 
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In practice, the accession process starts with submitting an application to the European Council, 
which is forwarded to the Commission. After collecting information about the applicant through a 
questionnaire, the Commission prepares an opinion about the applicant’s readiness to meet the 
accession criteria. The Commission can then recommend the opening of the negotiations to the 
Council. The Council must reach unanimity on starting the negotiations. The actual negotiations 
start with the adaptation of a negotiation framework. In the new methodology, chapters are 
clustered in six thematic groups.12 The opening and closing of each cluster requires the unanimous 
agreement of member states. When all chapters are closed, the European Parliament and each of 
the member states still need to approve the accession treaty.  
  
Although the enlargement as a process has changed over the time, the main actors of 
enlargement politics have remained the same: the member states, the Commission and the 
European Parliament. Enlargement can be seen as an intergovernmental policy in which the 
member states have the last word, the Commission monitors candidate countries’ performance 
against accession conditions and the Parliament must consent any new accession. Referring to 
enlargement process as “negotiations” is in a sense misleading, since the candidate countries 
themselves have no influence over the substance of the accession criteria and process. They have 
been only able to decide on the timing and speed of compliance and with the new sanction 
mechanism, not even that.  The role of the Commission is significant and often overlooked. 
Although it formally acts as a “technical assistant” of the Council in monitoring conditionality, in 
fact it plays a crucial role in preparing the applicants prior to negotiations, supporting them in 
fulfilling the accession criteria, providing yearly enlargement packages on the progress of 
candidate countries and developing enlargement policy. Some scholars argue that the Commission 
has expanded its role in enlargement politics through its direct engagement with the candidate 
countries throughout the accession process and that its influence will only increase with the ever-
more complicated process (Rudik, 2017). Özlem Terzi (2021), for example, has demonstrated how 
the Commission uses its power of agenda setting in impacting the emotional setting and norms of 
enlargement politics by “enabling or delimiting the options of the European Council”. This is one 
more reason why it is important to study closely the premises of the enlargement policies by the 
Commission.  
 
12 Fundamentals, Internal Market, Competitiviness and inclusive growth, Green agenda and sustainable connectivity, 
Resources, agriculture and cohesion, External relations (EC 2020a)  
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2.3 Research on EU enlargement  
 
Enlargement of the European Union has been widely researched from different perspectives.  The 
focus of research has shifted historically, reflecting practical questions and challenges in 
enlargement politics as well as more general trends in academia, and EU studies in particular 
(Gateva, 2019). There has also been a political need for integration research which has had its 
impact on what has been studied and how. The special position of enlargement in the intersection 
between different policy sectors has made it an interesting research topic for scholars in such 
fields as European security (Higashino, 2004; Shepherd, 2017), public opinion (Taydas & Kentmen-
Cin, 2017), political economy (Csaba, 2001; Likic-Brboric, 2011), migration (Favell & Hansen, 2002; 
Koff, 2005; Kraus & Schwager, 2004), national interests of the member states (Moravcsik & 
Vachudova, 2003), and geopolitics (Petrovic & Tsifakis 2021). The impact of enlargement to EU’s 
internal affairs and ”integrational capacity” has also been given attention (Börzel et al., 2017; 
Toshkov, 2017). A great deal of enlargement literature also discusses integration theories as 
explanations of enlargement, asking why do states want to join the EU and why does the EU want 
to enlarge (Sjursen, 2002). While this thesis has been influenced by myriad of different scholarly 
works, three branches of enlargement literature are particularly important here: research on 
European integration, European identity and the EU as a normative foreign policy actor. Each of 
these strands will be elaborated separately later in this chapter.  
 
While recent literature on EU enlargement is highly relevant in putting this thesis into context, it is 
important to remember that it dominantly deals with Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007 and 
its consequences. It is often that direct parallels are drawn between experiences of previous 
Eastern enlargement and the prospects of the accession of the Western Balkan countries. The 
post-accession developments of the East-Central European countries are reflected both in the 
academic literature as well as in the current political rhetoric of enlargement. While this is quite 
understandable (considering enlargement policy as a continuing process), treating Western Balkan 
countries as simply followers of the East-Central European countries can be also problematic, for it 
risks projecting the experiences of Eastern enlargement into the current developments and 
directing the attention solely into preventing the re-emergence of similar problems. It also works 
in renewing the image of all “Eastern” countries as a homogenic, essentialized group with 
generizable challenges.  
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Although enlargement politics as a phenomenon has been widely researched, the enlargement 
policy documents have not played a central role, even less from a critical perspective. There are 
some exceptions in this regard that work as important reference points for this thesis. Published 
already twenty years ago, Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling Eu Enlargement examines enlargement 
policy through the concepts of coloniality and empire (Böröcz & Kovács, 2001). The contributions 
of Melinda Kovács and Peter Kabachnik in this volume are of particular importance. They conduct 
discourse analysis on the Commission Opinions on the ten then-candidate countries in 1997 and 
Kovacs on the follow-up reports of 1998 and 1999, demonstrating how imperial and colonialist 
mentalities are present in EU policy documents(Kovács, 2001; Kovács & Kabachnik, 2001). This 
volume has been a major source of inspiration for this thesis, but it is high time to update this 
analysis. A more recent contribution is Tatjana Sekulić’s The European Union and the Paradox of 
Enlargement: The Complex Accession of the Western Balkans, a book that discusses the 
contradictions underlying the EU enlargement process. (Sekulić, 2020). Combining ethnographic 
research within the stakeholder institutions with discourse analysis on EC documents between 
2008 and 2019, Sekulić’s work offers a comprehensive understanding of the agencies and 
processes involved in enlargement negotiations. Based on her research, Sekulić criticises the weak 
position and lack of inclusion of applicant states in the enlargement process, showing that the 
one-directional conditionality is not very effective without a context-specific understanding of the 
candidate countries. This conclusion played an important role in framing the research setting for 
this thesis. Özlem Terzi (2020), in turn, approaches enlargement policy papers from the point of 
view he calls the “emotional norms of enlargement”. According to him, the enlargement process 
only makes progress when the official institutional discourse matches with the wider emotional 
understanding of who belongs to the EU or who does not. This argument supports the aim of this 
thesis to investigate the assumptions that shape enlargement politics, for it is only through 
transparency and reflection that we can assess such emotional norms. As a good and timely 
overview and further proof for enlargement policy paper’s relevance as empirical material, 
Petrovic and Tzifakis (2021) critically reflect the “geopolitical turn” initiated by the Commission by 
going through the enlargement policy papers from recent years in their introduction to a special 
issue13 on the contemporary challenges of EU enlargement policy.   
 
 
13 Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Volume 29, Issue 2 (2021): EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: The 
geopolitical turn or another postponement? 
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2.3.1 European integration studies  
 
Enlargement can be seen as a sub-category of European integration studies, representing the 
horizontal or widening (as opposed to vertical or deepening) aspect of integration. While the 
horizontal aspect of enlargement was long neglected in the integration literature, there has been 
an escalation of enlargement literature in the past decades, sparked in particular by the Eastern 
enlargement of 2004 and 2007. (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002) One of the 
most influential trends has been a so-called Europeanisation approach that has mainly focused on 
EU’s transformative power, that is, how well the new member and candidate states adapt or 
converge to EU norms and rules14. Europeanization literature has made an important contribution 
in studying the proliferation of EU norms and normative power, not only in candidate countries 
but also in the wider neighborhood. Similarly, research on EU conditionality has looked into the 
effectiveness and implications of the EU’s conditional policies in its external relations15. However, 
since the focus of this thesis is the enlargement discourse produced by the EU, not the 
performance of the candidate countries or the implications of conditionality, neither 
Europeanisation nor conditionality literature do not provide much for uncovering the normative 
background of enlargement politics in this thesis. Moreover, the starting point of 
Europeanisation/conditionality literature can even prove to be problematic, for it “directs us to 
think of the political space in terms of the Europeanization and European norms” (Kuus, 2007). 
According to Merje Kuus (ibid.), this has meant that the region has on the one hand been “moved 
discursively closer to Europe (proper) while, on the other hand, it has been inscribed with further 
degrees of Eastness (p. 155). Nevertheless, acknowledging conditionality as an institutionalized 
norm in enlargement politics is crucial, for it ultimately lays the framework of accession 
negotiations and its power dynamics in which the EU is the one setting conditions and the 
candidates the ones trying to fulfil them.  
 
Integration theories often aim to explain enlargement; why does it happen or why not. The 
theoretical explanations of enlargement can be roughly divided in two: rationalist and 
constructivist, depending on their ontological stance (F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier 2002). 
While the former usually focuses on the perceived benefits of enlargement, the latter aims to 
 
14 see Bojinović Fenko & Stahl, 2019; Kovacevic, 2019; Sedelmeier, 2011 
15 see Gateva, 2013, 2015; Hughes & Sasse, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Steunenberg & Dimitrova, 2007; Vos, 2017 
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explain enlargement through ideas, identities, and culture. Understanding enlargement politics as 
socially constructed, this thesis draws from the latter tradition. However, the focus here is not in 
explaining why enlargement happens but how does it happen.  
 
2.3.2 Enlargement and European identity  
 
Following the constructive turn in the 1990s, many of the International Relations scholars started 
to explore the role of collective identities in international relations. The discussion on whether 
there is such thing as European identity has ever since intensified, not least because of the EU’s 
own needs to bridge growing diversity between the new and the old member states as well as 
across political camps.16 This shows also in the enlargement literature, where enlargement politics 
is seen as a building site of European identity. The Eastern enlargement, in particular, is 
understood as a turning point in re-organisation of the European self-other relations (Hülsse, 
2006; Kuus, 2004, 2007; Zielonka, 2013). In defining who gets to become part of the “European 
family”, the EU can be seen to exercise power over defining Europeanness.   
 
In his analysis of EU enlargement discourse in Germany, Rainer Hülsse (2006) distinguishes five 
metaphors17 that are commonly used in describing enlargement process and discusses how each 
of those construct European identity. He argues that while the EU, having actually many different 
definitions of borders, is often described as a sui generis post-modern or post-nationalist polity, 
the metaphors still mainly construct an European identity that is very similar to national ones. 
Metaphors of EU enlargement as ”family reunion”, ”homecoming” or ”growing together” create 
image of European identity as primordial right or destiny for those who are considered part of the 
”European family” (Hülsse, 2006). This is very much visible in how the Western Balkans’ accession 
is often described as “completion” of European integration or fulfilling the historical responsibility 
towards the last members of European family. At the same time, the EU is emotionalized, that is, 
discursively transformed from political organization to” home” or” family”. This can also be seen 
as a de-politizasing the enlargement process: by using metaphors that construct enlargement as a 
 
16 For a detailed analysis on problems relate to European identity as concept, see Wiesner & Schmidt-Gleim (2014): 
The Meanings of Europe: Changes and Exchanges of a Contested Concept 
17 These metaphors are: enlargement as “family reunion”, “homecoming”, “growing together”, “path” and “entering 
into a house” (Hülsse, 2006)  
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matter of private or even ”natural” relations, enlargement politics can be shifted away from the 
realm of politics and democratic debate (ibid.).  
 
For Hülsse, the only empirical exception to exclusive and primordial differentiation is the 
metaphor of enlargement as a path.  In this narrative, the candidates are on their way to EU, 
which is the final destination, a Fukuyaman “end of history”, if you wish. The path is filled with 
“interim benchmarks” and the gradual progress depends on how well the candidate fulfills 
conditions set by the EU. Thus, the boundary between self and the other or European and non-
European is not so clear-cut. Instead, Hülsse proposes that the EU creates kind of more ambiguous 
“in-between spaces” or “inclusive positions”, where candidates can become more European, until 
they are European enough. From the point of view of this thesis, the path metaphor makes a very 
interesting case. As Hülsse argues, articulating enlargement process “reconstitutes the EU’s 
political control over the accession process”. Similar to “European perspective”18,  path metaphor 
gives a very vague and ambiguous picture of the accession process, but one with a clear direction: 
towards the EU. In contrast to the understanding of the EU as an exclusive club (or family) with 
clear, pre-determined borders, the path-metaphor constructs Europe and European identity as a 
temporal, not a spatial category. As pointed out by Ole Wæver (2000), everyone can become 
European, just not yet. He argues that by “drawing on the classical uncertainty about the Eastern 
boundary of Europe' -- 'the EU manages to place nobody as non-European but everybody as more 
or less European, more or less close to the centre (of Europe and of Europeanness)” (ibid., p.263). 
In placing Others in relation to European centre, the EU can be seen as exercising disciplinary 
power. 
 
Undeniably, the European identity project has been successful at least in one sense: the role of the 
EU in defining “European” is so strong, that in current research, it is hard to imagine what would 
be the” European” object of identification outside the EU. From this perspective, the EU has 
dominated the articulation of” European” and the contingency of the equation mark in the 
European=EU equation is discursively hidden.19 While the EU might be the only game in town 
 
18 European/EU perspective is another wording by the EU, used to communicate EU’s commitment to WB6 ‘s future 
accession. The most recent, revised enlargement strategy is called “Enhancing the accession process- a credible EU 
perspective for the Western Balkans” (EC 2020) 
19 However, this might be changing f. ex the recent debate on the meaning of rule of law shows that countries such as 
Hungary and Poland are promoting their alternative understanding of “European”  
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when it comes to European integration, it does not mean that European identity would be any 
more “real” or attractive from the point of view of Europeans themselves. The EU-led European 
identity project has been criticized not only for lacking any real polity (Habermas, 1995) but also 
for its top-down articulation that “draws on a dry, institutional, symbolic conception of identity” 
(Stavrakakis, 2005, p. 81). According to Yannis Stavrakakis, this “jouissance deficit” of European 
identity puts the whole future of European identity in jeopardy: Europeanness as an identity or 
fantasy can last only if it becomes more enjoyable or attractive.  Christoffer Kølvraa has responded 
to Stavrakakis by claiming in that European identity in fact can be a source of enjoyment 
(jouissance) that originates from declining nationalism. The legacy of the EU’s birth myth, 
historical post Second World War decision to say “never again” legitimates Europeans to feel 
superiority over nationalist desires as well as expect admiring gazes from the outside (Kølvraa, 
2016, 2018). For Kølvraa, the European identity is based on two assumptions: that Europe and 
Europeans are superior to their Others and that everyone wants to become European. From the 
point of view of enlargement discourse, this prompts a question of whether these attitudes could 
be seen in EU-produced enlargement discourse.  
 
2.3.3 Enlargement as foreign policy 
 
Rather than a sectoral issue, enlargement is often understood in a wider context of the EU’s 
foreign policy, for it concerns the Union’s relationships with other states and regions. Indeed, 
enlargement is often referred to as the most important and successful foreign policy tool of the 
EU. Beyond any bilateral relations, however, enlargement policy is about what kind of actor the EU 
is and wants to be in its neighborhood and in the global arena. The current Commission led by 
Ursula Von der Leyen, has called itself the “geopolitical commission” and wishes to re-vitalise the 
enlargement agenda by framing it as a geopolitical question vis-a-vis “third country influence” in 
the region (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021; Stanicek, 2020). Thus, the enlargement agenda is intertwined 
with other foreign policy interests.  
 
According to Ian Manners, the EU is a soft, normative power that by promoting its values and 
defending right-based multilateral cooperation changes the norms of international relations 
(Manners, 2002). Enlargement could be thus understood as a form of soft power whereby 
countries are not forced but persuaded to converge with EU’s norms. From the EU’s point of view, 
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its historically successful expansion works as a historical proof of the superiority and attractiveness 
of the “European model”. Thus, sustaining the enlargement process as a value-based project is not 
only a question of integration but also of the credibility and legitimacy of the whole European 
project.   
 
The balancing between geopolitical interests and sustaining enlargement as a normative process 
has produced what Nicolas Smith et al. (2020) call the democracy-stability dilemma of EU’s foreign 
policy. On the one hand, there is a strong interest to stabilise the neighboring regions to the EU 
through integration. On the other hand, compromising the normative agenda by i.e. cooperating 
with authoritarian leaders or “stabilitocrats” (Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, 2017) in 
the Western Balkan region is seen as risking the EU’s credibility as a normative power. 
 
Thus, as the democracy-stability dilemma demonstrates, defining enlargement as a foreign policy 
issue does not mean that it deals exclusively with external affairs (Sjursen & Smith, 2018). In this 
thesis, enlargement policy is understood as an example of a policy field where external and 
internal affairs intersect. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis combines two academic traditions: post-structuralist 
discourse theory (PDT) and postcolonial theory. I understand these two approaches here as 
complimentary, offering different ways to deconstruct, conceptualize and critically assess the 
phenomena at hand. In short, post-structuralist framework sets the ontological and 
epistemological basis of this study, while postcolonial theory offers more specific conceptual tools 
for the normative critique of the EU enlargement discourse. I will start this chapter by introducing 
postcolonial theory and reflecting how it impacts the way EU enlargement is understood in this 
thesis. I will then move on to introduce PDT and discuss how it can be operationalized in studying 
enlargement discourse. 
3.1 Postcolonial approaches 
Postcolonial theory is a diverse branch of theoretical approaches originally inspired by Edward 
Said’s path-breaking work on Orientalism (1995/1978). It has been further developed by thinkers 
such as Ashis Nandy, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. The starting point for 
postcolonial theories is that although many of the institutions that characterized colonialism in a 
traditional sense -such as slavery- have been officially dissolved, the patterns of economic, political 
and cultural control and exploitation prevail and therefore the concepts and the critique of 
colonialism stay relevant (Manzo, 2014). Indeed, as argued by David Potter, it was only the 
“international political dimension”, that is, the formal aspect of colonialism that ended through 
decolonisation (Potter, 1992). Thus, the focus is on uncovering and critically assessing the 
continuation of colonialism in other means. While postcolonial critique started with a focus on the 
relations between former colonies and colonizers, it has inspired scholars to look for colonialist 
and imperialist structures in less evident contexts. Given the global impact and scope of the 
colonial time it is possible to argue that the whole world is in a sense postcolonial, albeit 
differently in different contexts (Prasad, 2003). Colonialism can also be seen as deterritorialised: 
according to Nandy, what she calls “the second form of colonization” helps to “generalize the 
concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category” 
so that “the West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds” 
(Nandy, 1983, p. xi). As argued by Anshuman Prasad, the ways in which colonial mentalities still 
persist and manifest themselves are heterogenous and yet systematic in how the power 
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imbalances between “West” and the “rest” shape our world. This is often present as different 
forms of Eurocentrism, that is, the normalisation of European experience as the normal and the 
ideal (Kaiwar, 2014). 
Given that the founders and the first members of the European Community were also the most 
influential colonial powers, it is quite astonishing how the EU has managed to create a narrative of 
European integration without having to deal with its colonial past. In recent years, postcolonial 
approaches have gained momentum in EU studies, aiming to address what Patrick Pasture (2018) 
calls EU’s “institutional amnesia”. Scholars such as Pasture go as far as to argue that the initial 
motivations behind European integration were heavily influenced by (neo)colonialist interests, 
aiming to save the global influence of ex-colonialist powers after the end of the formal colonial 
rule. This resonates with Alan Milward’s idea of European integration as “rescuing” the nation 
state (Milward, 2000). 
In this thesis, postcolonial theory is important from two perspectives. First, as described above, 
the EU is here understood as a postcolonial actor in a postcolonial world. This means that we 
should pay attention to the ways in which the legacy of colonialism is present in EU’s policies. The 
second aspect is the EU’s relation to the Balkans and “the East” in more general. For example, Ivar 
Neumann (1998) and Maria Todorova (1997) have pointed out how the category of “Eastern 
Europe” as a half-way house between Europe and Asia was invented already in the 18th century. 
The end of the Cold War and the integration of the Eastern bloc into Western institutions has 
shifted attention to the (neo)colonial structures between the East and the West, as the 
“Europeanisation” of former socialist states offered a whole new arena for European “civilising 
mission”. In what follows, I will first discuss how the critique of Balkanism has sought to 
conceptualize and historically contextualize the EU/Europe-Balkan relations. I will then move on to 
other relevant literature that draw on different strands of post-colonialist critique in studying EU’s 
relation to its eastern “Others”. 
 
 3.1.1 Critique of Balkanism: Balkan as the Europe’s historical Other 
 
The critique of Balkanism is a strand of literature that applies postcolonial approaches in studying 
the relationship between ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’. Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans 
(1997) is often seen as the ground-breaking text and the starting point for critically assessing 
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Eurocentric, essentializing20 imaginaries and representations of the Balkans. For Todorova, the 
Balkans is “geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as ‘the Other’” 
(ibid., p. 455). It is “the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian” (ibid., p. 453), “a 
repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 
‘European’ and ‘the west’ has been constructed” (ibid. p, 455). While the geographical or cultural 
definitions of the ‘Balkan’ have been ambiguous, the idea of Balkans as somehow exceptionally 
and essentially violent and un-civilized has prevailed throughout centuries in the eyes of (Western) 
Europe, as any conflict in the region has been taken as another proof of that fixed, problematic 
nature of the “Balkan”. Similarly, Said (1995/1978) writes about how Orientalism constructs the 
“Orient” as the opposite of what is understood as Western, producing the “essence” of both as 
binary and hierarchical in relation to each other. Anshuman Prasad interprets Said, this 
“conceptual maneuver” provided the legitimization for colonialism, as the education of inferior 
cultures became almost a moral obligation, or “a project designed to civilize, improve, and help 
those peoples who were ‘lagging behind’ in the March of History and Civilization” (Prasad, 2004, p. 
12). 
 
Todorova’s analysis on the long history of “balkanising” attitudes prompts a question of whether 
similar imaginaries and the power imbalance are still in play, or even institutionalized in the 
enlargement process. From the postcolonial perspective, reinforcing the image of Balkans as a 
problematic region in an urgent need of European guidance can even help to legitimise the strict 
conditionality and the ‘one-way’ nature of the enlargement process. To become European in the 
right way, the Balkans need to be first de-Europeanized, to strip them off any leverage in defining 
what is European. Tanja Petrović, for example, argues that although European accession for the 
Balkan states should mean moving closer to Europe, it ends up pushing them into the “third world 
zone” (Petrović, 2014).  
 
While Europe’s relation to Balkans has often been constructed through a process of othering, 
Todorova has also pointed out how the Balkans represent the dark side within Europe, a reminder 
of the EU’s most horrifying Other: its own, violent history of wars, ethnic cleansing, and instability. 
 
20 Essentialism refers to “the idea that any specific group of objects or people (e.g., a race, gender, or class) is marked, 
identified, and defined by pure, immutable, and transhistorical characteristics and essences that inhere in the specific 
group in question, and that determine the fundamental and unique nature of that group” (Prasad, 2003, p. 25) 
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For example, Slavoj Žižek has suggested that “what Europe may be afraid to recognize in the 
recent Yugoslav war is the violent origin of its own system of nation-states"(Razsa & Lindstrom, 
2004). This causes a paradox, as the part that “Europeans” want to distance themselves is not in 
fact an external but rather an internal, constitutive part of Europe, one that has been denied of its 
belongingness to Europe.  
 
From the perspective of postcolonial theory and the critique of Balkanism in particular, it could be 
argued that the basis of the EU-Balkan relations is built on the ’West’, looking at the Balkans 
through the lenses of (relative) belatedness while being painfully reminded of its own past crisis 
and conflicts. The memory of uncontrollable violence is projected and capsulated to the Balkans, 
although similar conflicts have occurred everywhere in Europe throughout the history. Some 
scholars further claim that balkanization is further renewed and reinforced by a degree of “self-
balkanisation”; a variation of what Alexander Kiossev calls “self-colonization” (Kiossev, 1995, 
2008). For Kiossev, the term refers to cultures that have not been colonized in practice but 
because of “historical circumstances” have been “transformed into an extra-colonial ‘periphery’”, 
where “they had to recognize self-evidently the foreign cultural dominance and voluntarily absorb 
the basic values and categories of colonial Europe” (ibid., 2008). According to Kiossev, the power 
imbalance between the self-colonizing (the Balkans) and the center (Europe) stems from the fact 
that ”their own cultural identity emerged as a spin-off in the process of Euro-colonial hegemony, 
in an asymmetrical exchange with the colonial center”(Ibid.). This results in constant grieving to be 
recognized by the center that can be further used as a tool in legitimizing one-way processes of 
Europeanization, for example. In their empirical research, Maple Razsa and Nicole Lindstrom 
(Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004, p. 634) similarly argue that balkanism ”became an effective means of 
disciplining states like Croatia that aspire to be recognized as European”. Balkanization is also used 
by the countries themselves to highlight differences between those who have managed to “wave 
goodbye to Balkan” and those who seem to be unable to “overcome” their Balkanism and the 
“typical” problems it causes (ibid.). Thus, it could be argued that for the EU, self-balkanization, the 
by-product of its own discourses, would be useful in getting rid of 'Balkan’ in the process of 
Europeanization.  
 
Overall, from the point of view of “Balkanization” literature, the problem of enlargement politics is 
how it constructs enlargement as a one-way process in which “European” values, norms and 
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practices are exported to Balkans and how it is only the objects of the process, ‘the Balkans’, that 
change while ‘Europe’ is left untouched.  Thus, postcolonial theory can help in understanding the 
ways in which knowledge and practice is transferred from the West to the non-West, in this case 
from the EU to the Western Balkan countries (Prasad, 2003). 
 
3.1.2 Beyond essentialism: multiple layers of Europe and non-Europe 
 
While Balkanisation literature contributes to an accumulating body of postcolonial studies on the 
power asymmetry between the “East” and the “West”, many also point out that much has 
changed since the end of the Cold War and call for more nuanced and updated analysis on the 
East-West axis. Merje Kuus (2007), for example, argues that while Balkanizing narratives that 
essentialise the ”East” and create east-west dichotomies have been very dominant in the early 
days of Eastern enlargement, there has been a gradual shift in the enlargement discourse during 
past decades. According to her, “the EU’s less European and in some sense threatening periphery 
has become vaguer and more flexible: a single insecure Eastern Europe has been layered into 
many ones” (ibid., p. 151). Countries and regions are no more simply placed in Europe (proper) or 
the East (non-Europe), but instead possess different degrees of Eastness and Europeanness, 
depending on how well they converge to European norms. This also enables a new kind of 
disciplinary power for the EU, since the East “is framed as both secure and still being secured, and 
both Europe and still not fully European” (ibid., 152). For Kuus, this inscription of Eastness reduces 
complex societal issues and developments into a process of “catching up”. Kuus’s argument, thus, 
points to a similar conclusion than Hülsse’s path metaphor and Ole Wæver’s approach to 
‘Europeanness’ as a fragmented and ambiguous category (discussed in chapter 2). These 
conclusions in mind, the analysis in this thesis will look into whether both essentializing or 
“traditional” forms of colonialism and more ambiguous “multi-layering” can be found from 
enlargement discourse.  
 
Another relevant perspective to EU-Other relations for this thesis is proposed by Jan Zielonka 
(2013), who sees the EU as a modern empire. According to him, the EU possesses the essential 
characteristics of an empire: “vast territorial unit with the ability to influence -- the international 
agenda and shape the notion of legitimacy (if not normality) in various parts of the world and 
especially in its neighbourhood” (ibid., 36). Although many see the EU as a historically unique 
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institution, Zielonka argues that “the EU does what all historical empires have always done, 
namely it exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations or various 
forms of informal domination” (ibid.). He sees the EU as exercising normative power through 
civilizing missions, embodied in enlargement politics and other forms of conditional external 
relations. However, in contrast to Balkanization literature, Zielonka’s theoretical model leaves 
room for many types of agency and interaction, since he sees that the success or the failure of the 
EU’s imperial missions depend primarily on its ability to generate legitimacy, both internal and 
external. In his own words, “civilizing missions are seen as fulfilling their purpose if both 
metropolis and periphery view them as credible and desirable for a mixture of moral, historical, 
cultural and utilitarian reasons” (ibid., 37). Similarly, it has been proposed that the EU’s influence 
is based on its ability as a normative power (Manners, 2002) to use “soft power” or persuasion in 
contrast to stick and carrots of economic and military “hard power” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005). 
From the perspective of enlargement discourse, then, this would mean that while the 
enlargement process may well be one-directional, it should still seek to be legitimized by the 
candidate countries, otherwise it loses its appeal.  
 
Furthermore, besides arguing for more complex and multi-layered approaches to enlargement 
discourse, recent studies also remind that black-and-white understandings of enlargement 
sometimes unduly treat candidate countries as passive victims. This runs a risk of creating and 
reinforcing one-sided understandings of the phenomena. Sonja Grimm (2019), for example, argues 
that the enlargement negotiations are more interactive that they are given credit for. It has also 
been argued that the “in-between” position of Eastern European countries in general can be 
beneficial, providing countries with bargaining power and different kind of agency (Miklóssy & 
Smith, 2019). 
 
Overall, it could be argued that whereas power imbalances still clearly shape and frame the east-
west- relations, this is clearly not the whole story; enforcing a dichotomy might prevent us from 





3.2 Post-structuralist discourse theory and the logics approach  
 
The way in which the social world and meanings are seen in this thesis is based on post-
structuralist discourse theory (PDT), a post-structuralist approach developed notably by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their 1985 book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, see also e.g. Jacobs, 2018; Jørgensen & Phiilips, 2002). 
More specifically, the ontological and epistemological premise - as well as the empirical analysis- 
follow the Logics of Critical Explanation (hereafter “Logics approach), a post-positivist approach 
developed by Jason Glynos and David Horwath (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, 2008). While putting in 
motion their own way of explanation in social science, the Logics approach builds on Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s theoretical foundation, sharing their basic ontology and main premises. Importantly, 
theory and methodology are not here seen as separate realms of research, but closely 
intertwined. In this chapter, I will focus on introducing the main theoretical concepts and 
assumptions that are central for PDT’s understanding of the social reality, elaborate Logics 
approach in more detail and discuss its implications in the context of this thesis.   
 
3.2.1 Post-structuralist discourse theory (PDT)  
 
Whatever is called ‘Truth’ and adorned with capital letters masks its own contingency 
and untruth, even as it masks the capacity for being-otherwise. 
(Caputo, 2000, p. 36)  
 
The origins of post-structuralist theories can be traced back to France in the late 1960s, where a 
new generation of thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida gained influence. At the time, the debate on structuralism was at its heights. While sharing 
similar “epistemic horizon” (Marttila, 2015), diverse post-structuralist approaches emerged as 
responses to structuralists’ claims of self-suffiency. Since then, poststructuralist thinking has been 
influential in providing critical explanations of different social, political and cultural phenomena 
(Howarth, 2013). In the context of this thesis, it is important to point out that PDT has recently 
gained popularity in institutional research, for “its conceptualization of power, subjectivity, and 
ideas, as well as its critical perspective, holds great promise for the study of institutions” and 
institutional change and continuity, in particular (Jacobs, 2019, p. 379).  
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Post-structuralists share the idea of discursive and contingent nature of all social relations, 
practices and institutions (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Jørgensen & Phiilips, 2002; Marttila, 2015). 
Discursivity and discourse are concepts that are used to explain the centrality of language and 
shared meanings in structuring the social world. Language is essential for (post)structuralists 
because it produces shared meanings and therefore constitutes social.21 The analysis of these 
meanings is always contextual: as argued by Glynos and Howarth, “we cannot sever beings from 
the relational contexts in which they appear, and from the particular interpretations that 
constitute their meaning” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 30). The argument about the relational 
ontology of meaning was first made popular by Ferdinand de Saussure and became one of the 
main premises of structuralism. The idea of relational position is shared by poststructuralists alike. 
As described by Tomas Marttila (2015), Saussure‘s genius was in how he understood that it was 
”not objects’ inherent phenomenal characteristics, but systems of signs conceptualizing them that 
defined our understanding of the objects referred-to" (p. 25). This is not to deny that things do not 
exist without language, but to argue that they do not have any independent meaning outside of 
their discursive field and their relative position in it. Neither does it entail that language is 
understood as a reified, organic system that exists independently of subjects. In contrast, in 
stressing how meanings are socially constructed, (post)structuralists have challenged positivist 
approaches that understand the social world as independent, “out there”, similar to all of us. Post-
structuralists such as Glynos and Howarth, then, identify themselves (broadly) as post-positivists, 
insisting that there is no neutral way to conduct research, nor ”independent yardstick beyond our 
interpretations which would allow us to leave them behind, and focus instead on the ‘procedures’ 
or ’methods and techniques’ of science to determine the right answer” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, 
p. 40). Instead, the empirical inquiry always starts from hermeneutics, through contextualized self-
interpretations.   
 
In addition to discursivity, the other cornerstone of the post-structuralist ontological framework is 
that all social structures are contingent, that is, possible but not necessary. As an important 
contrast to structuralists, then, the relative positions of meanings are not seen as stable or fixed, 
because the connections between signs are not given or necessary but change in ongoing 
 
21 Although this thesis focuses on meanings in texts, discourse can be also non-verbal: images, practices, tones 
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language use (ibid.). Since all social objects are constituted as objects of discourse, this means that 
there is nothing” imperative or indispensable in how we understand the world” (Jacobs, 2019, p. 
383). The notion of radical contingency highlights the non-necessary character of the status quo, 
opening room for critique; existing social reality is possible but not necessary. In fact, the way 
things seem to be” naturally” or necessarily as they are only because they are articulated or 
defined as such. Articulation is a way to use power by assigning meaning where the link between 
the material and the meaning is always contingent. The concept of articulation as the source of 
discourse is explained by Laclau and Mouffe as follows: “[W]e will call articulation any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call 
discourse” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 91). 
 
However, these articulations of meaning are never final, since the condition of radical contingency 
means that no discourse is “ready” and can ever truly capture its object. This is because for post-
structuralists, both the subjects and the objects are always-already incomplete and escape any 
comprehensive explanation or “fixation” (Jørgensen & Phiilips, 2002). In terms of Jacques Lacan, 
this condition is expressed as the “lack in the symbolic Other” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 113)22. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is here sufficient to understand that the radically contingent and 
structurally incomplete nature of all systems of social relations means that their re- and de-
structuration remains always possible. This openness of the discursive field is captured in the 
concept of dislocation (ibid., p. 104). In moments of dislocation, the contingency of any discursive 
structure may become visible, thus challenging existing structures and opening new possibilities 
for identification.   
 
For this thesis, adapting post-structuralist position means that EU enlargement policy is seen as a 
discursive structure in which the meanings are articulated by different subjects in the policy-
making process. Thus, although enlargement strategies may have significant material 
consequences, they are not themselves but articulations of meaning that can be renewed or 
contested. Since articulations such as the enlargement strategies are the result of negotiations 
between different stakeholders, they can be seen as a site of power struggle over the articulation 
 
22 For more detailed analysis on Lacanian ontology, see Glynos, 2001; 2008; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Stavrakakis, 
1999 
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of enlargement policy. The premise of radical contingency also suggests that this struggle is not 
finite, that is, enlargement policies are never “ready”, because as other social objects, they are 
structurally lacking and cannot be completed. Instead, we can treat enlargement strategies as kind 
of “snapshots” or moments in this ever-evolving discursive structure. They represent the 
articulation of the enlargement discourse in certain time and place and thus connect their present 
with the past and the future (Glynos & Howarth 2007, p. 105). Analysing these “frozen” images of 
enlargement, then, enables for analysis of change, continuity and contestation in the structure of 
meanings. This is where the concept of dislocation becomes crucial; in comparing the new 
enlargement methodology with the previous one, I understand the new methodology as a 
potential moment of dislocation. For Glynos and Howarth and their Logics approach, the way in 
which subjects react to dislocation is crucial; it defines whether the radical contingency is 
recognized or covered over with an ideological response. In the next chapter, I will move on to 
discuss the Logics approach and its implications in more detail.  
 
3.2.2 Logics of Critical Explanation  
 
Although different post-structuralist theories have gained popularity over the last decades, the 
approach has suffered from a lack of methodological developments. The Logics approach by Jason 
Glynos and David Howarth (2007; 2008) propose a novel approach to this methodological deficit. 
Building on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the Logics approach focuses on four dimensions 
of social reality (social, political, ideological and ethical) and the role of three logics (social, political 
and fantasmatic) in critically explaining it.  What is novel in this framework is how it challenges 
both the positivist and hermeneutic approaches by combining different elements from them. 
Thus, it enables a kind of “middle-range theorizing” that moves “between empirical phenomena, 
consisting of self-interpretations and practices, and our underlying ontological premises” (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007, p. 164). For the purposes of this thesis, the strength of the Logics approach that 
it does not only focus on (critically) describing the existing norms but also asks how they have 
emerged and how they are defended, maintained, transformed or contested. This way, it is 
possible to assess the normative background of the enlargement discourse by analysing what is 
challenged in the new enlargement methodology, what has left untouched and how these 
decisions are argued for.  
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Previously, the Logics approach has been used in studying wide range of different public 
discourses such as UK banking reform (Glynos, Klimecki, et al., 2015), health policy (Glynos, Speed, 
et al., 2015), education policy(Andersson & Öhman, 2016; Clarke, 2012; Papanastasiou, 2018),  
urban austerity programmes (Fuller & West, 2017) and British EU-policy debates(Hawkins, 2015). 
More precisely, critical analysis of EU climate adaptation policy by Elise Remling  (2018b, 2018a) 
and a critical reading of the EU’s social innovation policy discourse by Fougere et al. (2017) have 
shown that the Logics approach can be fruitfully applied in critical analysis of different EU policies. 
In what follows, I will introduce the Logics approach in more detail by going through the central 
concepts and discussing how they are related to the research question at hand.  
 
Ontological remarks  
 
The basic units of analysis in Logics approach are what Glynos and Howarth (2007) refer to as 
practices and regimes. A regime both structures and is comprised of social practices, that are the 
“ongoing, routinized forms of human and societal reproduction”, kind of sedimented ways of 
living, thinking and doing things (ibid., p. 104). These activities are captured in the concept of 
social dimension of social reality, in which subjects are “absorbed in their practices” and do not 
register the contingency of social relations (ibid., p. 112). As noted earlier, however, a dislocatory 
moment, or “a moment when a sense emerges, that things are not quite right” (ibid., p. 143) 
might provoke a disruption of the “business as usual” of social practices and provoke political 
practices that struggle to “challenge and transform the existing norms, institutions and practices” 
(ibid., p. 105). This is when the political dimension of social reality is foregrounded and the 
experience of dislocation is articulated as a public contestation of the existing social relations or 
attempts to neutralize such challenges in the name of a principle or ideal. Thus, political practices, 
when successful, can transform and institute a new regime of social practices (ibid., p. 105). In this 
thesis, I will treat the new enlargement methodology as a political practice and public contestation 
that seeks to (partly) challenge and transform the earlier social practices of enlargement politics in 
the name of “credibility, predictability, dynamism and stronger political steer”, as articulated by 
Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi (2020) . 
 
 As there is no primordial meaning before articulation, every social practice has political roots; 
however natural or necessary some practice may seem, it has a political history that has involved 
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the exclusion of some other possibilities (Glynos & Howarth 2007). Thus, a regime always has an 
outside that both constitutes its identity (what is it not) but also threatens its existence as such, 
because the frontiers of any regime can be re-drawn. Following Edmund Husserl’s suggestion, 
then, the task of a researcher is to recognize and re-activate these political origins of regimes and 
practices in order to show the contingency of existing practices and to explore how the alternative 
options were excluded or repressed during the institution or sedimentation of the given practice 
(Husserl, 1970, p. 353–378). In this case, this means deconstructing the enlargement discourse and 
its normative background.  
 
To understand this ontological horizon, it is important to point out that although social and 
political dimensions may overlap, they are both always present and not reducible to each other. 
Interpreting any phenomenon only through its social or political dimension would mean ignoring 
that “there is never a complete disappearance of political practices, nor a complete politicization 
of all social relations” (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 117).  
 
While focusing on the political and social dimensions reveals whether the existing social order is 
publicly contested or not, the two other dimensions, ideological and ethical, capture the way in 
which subjects react to dislocatory moments. According to Glynos and Howarth, it is crucial how 
subjects are “either complicit in concealing the radical contingency of social relations (ideological 
dimension) or -- attentative to its constitutive character” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 14). In the 
former case, the response is ideological since the subject misrecognices its “real conditions of 
existence”, that is, the radical contingency and the non-necessary nature of the social relations. In 
identifying with a particular discourse, the subject is “gripped” by an ideology that covers over 
radical contingency and makes all practices feel natural or given (ibid., p. 117). In contrast, an 
ethical response to a dislocatory moment would require the recognition of the contingent nature 
and a critical re-activation of its origins. Importantly, the ethical-ideological dimension does not 
necessarily coincide with the social-political axis; political practices can very well be ideological. 
This is the crucial aspect to remember while analysing potential change in discourses, existing 
social practices, such as enlargement strategy, can be contested without being attentive to the 
contingent nature of the regime and its practices, thus ignoring the very foundations of the 
regime. In other words, looking at the ideological-ethical dimension can help us to discover 
whether it is only the substance of social practices that is contested, as might be in the case of 
 35 
ideological response, or the very assumptions behind these practices. In other words, this 
dimension can be used as a critical tool in exploring how fundamental or ideological was the 
change in enlargement methodology.  
 
Logics – the basic units of explanation  
 
Whereas the four dimensions of social reality comprise the ontological framework of social reality, 
the three logics (social, political and fantasmatic) are used as the basic units of explanation in 
critically accounting the problematized phenomenon at hand. Simply put, it could be said that the 
three logics provide three different ways to address phenomenon, each answering different 
questions:  what, how and why. Best described by Glynos and Howarth themselves: “if social logics 
assist in the process of characterizing what a practice is, political logics show how it is challenged 
and defended, then fantasmatic logics can be said to generate reasons for why practices are 
maintained or transformed” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 108).  
 
As all dimensions of social reality are present in practices and regimes, every logic is also 
important in providing critical explanations. It should be noted, however, that the principle aim is 
not to "discover” logics themselves, but to use them as tools in investigating “the ‘possibilities of 
phenomena” (ibid., p. 135). Corresponding to the social dimension, social logics describe the 
status quo of sedimented practices and ask what has been taken for granted in the current 
discourse. In short, it constitutes “the social accepted ‘rules of the game’, the unsaid background 
of a discourse” (Remling 2018a, p. 4). Social logics are always tied to their particular context, which 
enables domain-sensitive analysis. In the context of this thesis, these would be the uncontested, 
taken-for-granted elements in enlargement strategies.  
 
However, focus on social logic is not sufficient in explaining how and why certain social structure 
came into being. Political logics aims to tackle the emergence of discourses, asking “how a certain 
discourse evolves, functions and how its different elements are connected with each other” 
(Remling 2018a, p. 4).  In contrast to social logics, which concern the following of the ‘rules’, 
political logics refer to the institution of these rules. By studying the development of a discourse, it 
is possible to identify moments of change and continuity as well as how discourse is challenged or 
institutionalized. Political logics are invoked in what Laclau and Mouffe call logics of equivalence 
 36 
and difference (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). These refer to different articulatory strategies by which 
political frontiers are  “stabilized, strengthened or weakened” through inclusion and exclusion 
(ibid.). In practice, using equivalence as an articulatory strategy could mean connecting different 
demands and subject positions in an equivalential chain by downplaying their differences and 
highlighting their similarities. In enlargement strategy, these are for example moments where the 
“common interests” of Western Balkan countries and the EU are highlighted. Alternatively, logics 
of difference would point out how the Western Balkans countries differ from the EU members or 
how some policy has nothing to do with another one. For example, while highlighting the common 
goals of enlargement politics, the responsibilities of member and candidate countries are 
differentiated so as to point out their inside and outside positions.  
 
Lastly, the fantasmatic logics refer to the why-part of the question: why do some discourses 
prevail and are seen as natural, necessary or desirable? As noted earlier in separating between 
ideological and ethical dimensions of social reality, a dislocatory moment may be responded by 
either recognizing the radical contingency and the political origins of a discourse or covering over 
it. Fantasy here, understood in terms of Jacques Lacan, is the discourse that aims to cover the lack 
in the symbolic other, that is, the contingency of all social. Fantasy structures subject’s desires by 
concealing the fact that everything is unstable and there is no “closure” to reach. It provides 
subjects with traits of identification (such as political ideology, for example) and the (false) 
promise of a “fullness-to-come” (Remling, 2018b, p. 5) or an “illusion of a final fixation of 
meaning” leading to “a fully reconciled social order” (Hawkins, 2015, p. 143).   
 
From analytical perspective, tracing fantasmatic logics enables to explain why some discourses and 
meanings prevail as hegemonic and manage to “grip” their subjects while others do not. In 
practice, it directs us to ask how certain social or political practices are argued for and what tactics 
of persuasion are used. Furthermore, Glynos and Howarth differentiate between “beatific” and 
“horrific” forms of fantasy. In practice, the former typically lays out the path to “fulness” or some 
kind of utopian fantasy, provided that some obstacle is removed, or the proposed course of action 
is taken (Remling, 2018b, p. 5). Correspondingly, horrific fantasy summons “a looming disaster 
that steals the enjoyment of a prosperous future” if the proposed action is not taken (ibid.). Simply 
put, fantasmatic logic focuses on the parts of discourse where the subject is persuaded through 
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causal claims. In enlargement discourse, these would be the parts of enlargement strategy 
claiming that something good or bad will happen if something is done or not.  
 
 In short, in this thesis the three logics are used to explore the normative background of the 
enlargement discourse by asking what are the unquestioned ‘rules’ of the enlargement policy 
(social logic), how are they contested or institutionalised (political logic) and argued for 
(fantasmatic logic). In chapter 4, I will discuss what this means in practice.  
 
3.3 Conclusion: why is it important to combine postcolonial theory and PDT? 
 
The idea for combining the postcolonial and post-structuralist theories in this thesis stemmed 
from two overlapping themes between these approaches: discursivity and critique. As discussed in 
this chapter, colonialism, balkanism or orientalism are more than just the material or military 
asymmetry or the formal forms of governance. According to Edward Said, imperialism requires 
"the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant 
territory” (Said, 1993, p. 9). Here, the relationships between the metropolis and peripheries as 
well as the culture and discourses these relations produce are of central importance. Therefore 
establishing, maintaining and collapsing of colonialist structures cannot be understood outside or 
without different colonialist discourses. As pointed out by post-structuralists, this is not to say that 
material world does not matter but to argue that social meanings that are used to motivate and 
legitimate forms of social behavior, such as imperialism/colonialism, do not exist independently, 
“out there”, but are produced and articulated in language and through culture and exist only in 
relation to other social meanings. In other words, “postcolonialism’s deployment of the notion of 
discourse, -- is meant to highlight—in the context of exercise of imperial power—the mutual 
imbrication of the material and the ideological, and to emphasize the importance of not collapsing 
either of these categories into the other” (Prasad, 2003, p. 8). Although discourse from the 
ontological point of view is not in itself material, imperialism/colonialism can be seen as an 
example of how ideology and discourse can have fundamental materialistic consequences. On the 
other hand, the relation is not one-directional; material world and its realities (such as who has 
the most resources) also shape the platform for discourses. In the context of the EU enlargement, 
the importance of material and its link to colonial legacy is evident. As argued by József Böröcz 
(2001), “the very combination of wealth, power, centrality and privilege, which owes its existence 
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to the colonial past of the EU countries, constitutes the iron core of magnetism for the Eastern 
countries to even consider joining this elite club” (pp. 15-16).  
 
For this thesis, adopting such ontological understanding means that enlargement discourse is 
understood both constituted in and constituting of the material world, shaped by (post)colonial 
structures. Consequently, I side with postcolonial theorists in arguing that any relations between 
the EU and its Others cannot be seen outside or somehow independent of the colonial legacies. 
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4. Methodology and data  
  
   
The researching subject leaves its trace through acts of judgement   
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 186)   
   
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the theoretical concepts of post-structuralist discourse 
theory (PDT) and the logics approach by Glynos and Howarth, this chapter will be devoted to 
issues that concern more directly the research practice, that is, how the empirical work is will be 
conducted. This thesis follows the logics approach, shares its epistemological premises and 
applies them to my own research. The empirical framework developed by Elise Remling (2018a, 
2018b) will be used for operationalizing the logics approach in policy research. In what follows, I 
will first clarify the epistemological premises that guide the research process: retroduction, 
articulation and judgement. These premises are discussed in length, which I consider essential 
from the point of view of research ethics. I will then move on to introduce the data and finally 
discuss how Remling’s analytical framework is applied in this thesis.   
   
4.1 Epistemological principles: retroduction, articulation and judgement  
  
Methodologically speaking, the aim of the logics approach is to challenge the so-called causal law 
paradigm in social science that puts emphasis on prediction and deduction, usually separating 
strictly between different phases of research, such as planning, execution and reporting (Glynos 
et al., 2009; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The paradigm has also been criticized for undermining the 
historical and social context of the phenomena under study. While these shortcomings have been 
previously addressed by focusing either on contextualized self-interpretations or causal 
mechanisms, Glynos and Howarth argue that both of these fall short in challenging the paradigm 
in a meaningful way (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). In the logics approach, contextualized self-
interpretations are seen as an important starting point for empirical inquiry, but insufficient for 
any generalizing research.  Focus on causal mechanisms, in turn, builds on neo-positivist and 
critical realist theories, and therefore it fails in “escaping the shadow of the causal law paradigm” 
(Glynos et al., 2009, p. 9). The logics approach, then, seeks to oppose the causal law paradigm in 
an alternative way, by re-working and deconstructing the causal mechanisms and contextualized 
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self-interpretations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, see chapters 2 & 3) and thus blurring the line 
between theoretical and the empirical as well as particular and universal.    
   
Importantly, in the logics approach, social science explanation is understood as problem-driven, as 
opposed to method- or theory-driven. In practice, this means that the starting point for research 
is not any method of data gathering or analysis nor the intention to test a particular theory. 
Instead, the principal motivation is to problematize, explain and understand better the 
phenomena at hand, in this case the postcolonial EU enlargement discourse. Consequently, 
research in this thesis is not seen as a one-way process, but rather a (semi-)open practice, where 
the researcher moves back and forth between the theory and the empirical data. This is 
capsulated in the philosophical concept of retroduction or abduction, that will be discussed in the 
following.    
   
   
Retroduction   
   
In the logics approach, retroduction is seen as the guiding principle in engaging with the empirical 
material. The concept was originally coined by Charles Sander Peirce, who separates retroduction 
(or abduction) 23 as a third logic of reasoning between induction and deduction (Peirce, 
1974/1934, 1935). While induction refers to reasoning that moves from observations to 
generalizations and deduction to subsumption that seeks to apply known theories to specific 
contexts, abductive reasoning can be defined as “selecting or inventing a provisional hypothesis to 
explain a particular empirical case or data set better than any other candidate hypotheses and 
pursuing this hypothesis through further investigation” (Kennedy & Thornberg, 2018, p. 52). 
Peirce himself describes the differences between the three logics as follows: “Deduction proves 
that something must be; induction shows that something actually is operative; abduction merely 
suggests that something may be.” (Peirce, 1974/1934,1935, p. 106).  
   
Thus, in abduction, the researcher practices a sort of informed and reflective “guessing” in 
examining how the empirical observations fit together with existing knowledge and further 
modifying, elaborating or rejecting the theory by putting together different elements in order to 
 
23 In his writings, Peirce uses different terms such as abduction, retroduction, presumption, and hypothesis when 
referring to this ‘third way’ of reasoning. The precise meaning of abduction in his writings also changed over time and 
is still debated (Koskela et al., 2018). Here, I use the terms retroduction and abduction interchangeably. 
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understand the phenomena under study (ibid.; Reichertz, 2014, p. 127). The strength of abductive 
or retroductive method is that while it is grounded in theoretical concepts (here the logics 
approach and postcolonial theory), it still leaves room for surprises and modification of the 
framework during the research process. This way, while there is a certain framework through 
which the data is approached, the limits of what can be found from the data are not defined 
beforehand. Indeed, Peirce himself sees abduction as the only logic that allows the researcher to 
come up with new ideas.24 (Peirce, 1974/1934,1935, p. 106). While the separation of the three 
logics of reasoning is helpful in clarifying different ways of thinking and making decisions during 
the research process, I think that the whole process is better understood as what Kennedy and 
Thornberg call the interplay between induction, deduction and abduction:  
 
Interplay between induction (in which the researchers are never tabula rasa), 
deduction (in which the researchers are always open to re-think, modify, challenge, 
and reject the theory or hypothesis in their interaction with data), and abduction (in 
which the researchers always consider their conclusions as fallible and provisional) 
creates powerful iterative processes between data collection and analysis, and 
between data and theory. In these iterative processes, qualitative researchers will 
not only situate their studies and their findings in the current knowledge base of the 
field but also contribute to it by extending, challenging, refining, or revising it. 
(Kennedy & Thornberg, 2018, pp. 61–62)    
 
As described above, adopting this type of “iterative process” of combining and connecting 
different elements puts a heavy emphasis on the involvement of the researcher in the research 
process. To clarify how this impacts the way in which empirical inquiry is understood in this thesis, 
I will next turn to discuss articulation and judgement as integral aspects of research.   
   
 
Articulation and the double hermeneutics    
   
Recalling the ontological assumptions of radical contingency and discursivity in post-structuralist 
theory and PDT in particular (see chapter 3), both the object and the subject of research are here 
seen as socially constructed. Thus, the social world is not understood as something that exists 
 
24  For more detailed discussion on Peirce’s abduction and innovative thinking, see Koskela et al., 2018  
 42 
independently, “out there” for researchers to study. Researcher is never able to analyse the social 
world from the outside through some neutral standards but is inevitably influenced by their own 
assumptions as well as the discourses they encounter while researching. However, this is not to 
say that scientific research cannot be conducted but rather points out that it requires a different 
kind of approach, one where the researcher does not assume neutrality and constantly pays 
attention to their position. From the methodological point of view, this means that research is 
pursued from a position of “double hermeneutics”, where the reflexivity of the research process 
is seen as two-fold, concerning both the object of the study and the researcher as an agent of 
knowledge production(Berenskoetter, 2011; Guzzini, 2000). Similar idea can be understood 
through the concept of articulation, central to PDT and the logics approach. Recalling Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s definition of articulation from the previous chapter, it was defined as “any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result”(Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1987, p. 91).Thus, articulation is the very act of giving meaning to concepts by 
“combining and connecting certain words, objects, ideas, and concepts in specific ways when they 
speak or act” (Jacobs, 2018, p. 298). When these articulations are repeated, they became 
sedimented structures of the social world, that is, discourses. Consequently, the object of critical 
discourse analysis is ultimately the articulation of different elements that form a discourse, such 
as the enlargement policy discourse. On the other hand, the researching subject is also 
articulative, since they articulate a particular research question and analytical setting by 
combining different elements and judging them as worthy of research. While this articulation may 
be well informed and preferably relies on earlier research, it is never neutral. Recognition of 
agency commits researchers to pay attention to their bias both for ethical reasons and 
transparency as well as for understanding themselves how the research process is influenced 
(Berenskoetter, 2011).    
   
In this thesis, I problematize the EU enlargement discourse through post-colonialist critique and 
thus articulate enlargement discourse as something that should be studied from this particular 
perspective, which is in no way evident or necessary by any external, metaphysical law, but a 
choice I have made as a researcher and producer of knowledge. Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, this problematization is firmly rooted in earlier literature and is connected to a 
wider normative agenda of decentring Europe through post-colonial critique (Onar & Nicolaïdis, 
2013).   
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Judgement    
   
This brings us to the question of judgement, that is, the decisions of the researcher as a part of 
the research process.  While individual judgement and the following bias is often seen as a 
weakness of social science research vis-à-vis more universal standards in natural sciences, I here 
share Glynos and Howarth’s critique of such tendency to measure the relevance of social inquiry 
against natural science’s standards. Instead, in their logics approach, individual judgement of the 
researcher is seen as a necessary condition in conducting meaningful research on the social world 
through combining, connecting and generalizing. Thus, judgement is here understood as a 
combination of theoretical expertise, intuition, and articulatory practice rather than pure 
intuitionism.    
   
What is important to realize here is that while the background of the researcher necessarily 
impacts the framings and interpretations carried out in this thesis, it also makes it unique. 
Combined with the radically contingent and constantly evolving nature of discourses, the research 
setting challenges yet another norm of traditional scientific practice, that of replication. This 
research cannot be repeated as exactly the same by me or anyone else, because a) the research is 
affected and relies on my own perception and b) because it is conducted in a specific historical 
time and place. While the “failure” of post-modern (here: constructivist and post-structuralist) 
epistemological cultures to comply with the standards of replication and repeatability has been a 
target of critique, I claim that insisting on replication as a strict standard in interpretative inquiry is 
in this case counter-productive and only renews the artificial catch-up position of social sciences 
in relation to natural sciences. I thereby agree with Freese and Peterson, who propose that 
“normative questions about replication for social scientists need to be understood on their own 
terms” (Freese & Peterson, 2017, p. 152). From the point of view of this thesis, this means that 
while the epistemological principles of double hermeneutics deny the possibility of replication of 
the exact same research, it does not mean that the research setting cannot be “scientific”. Rather, 
the standards of good research are here defined differently from natural science, understanding 
transparency through reflectivity rather than absolute repeatability.     
   
Besides acknowledging that the conditions and context of the research are always subjective, 
committing to post-structuralist epistemological culture also means that we cannot expect that 
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the replication of the research setting by somebody else would provide similar or directly 
comparable results. Since the research practice is interpretative, the ‘results’ are also necessarily 
tied to the judgement of the researching subject and context of the research, therefore open-
ended and contestable. As argued by Glynos and Howarth, “the crucial ingredient of an 
articulatory (research) practice involves conceptualizing the relation between articulated 
elements as non-necessary or contingent” (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 179). However, they also 
propose that identified logics (especially political and fantasmatic) could be transported (with 
caution) and utilized in comparative research, as long as one is sensitive to the differences 
between research contexts.  
   
Thus, the importance of judgement of the researcher does not mean that the research process is 
completely subjective. Instead, following Glynos and Howarth, judgement should be understood 
as reflective and situational. (Glynos & Howath 2007, p. 183). By reflective judgement, Glynos and 
Howarth refer to Immanuel Kant’s analytical separation between determinative and reflective 
judgement:   
  
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the judgement, which 
subsumes the particular under it is determinative – But if only the particular is given 
and judgement has to find the universal for it, then this power is reflective (Kant, 
1987, pp. 18-19, cited in Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 183)   
    
Thus, in “refective judgement, one is confronted with a particularity for which no determinate 
concept is readily available or given” and the task of the researcher is to connect the particular 
with the general through synthesis of diverse elements (Glynos & Howath 2007, p. 183). 
Situational judgement, in turn, means that the researcher grows into their task while exploring 
the context; the judgement required to evaluate what something means in a specific context is 
acquired through “immersing oneself in a given discursive field” (ibid., p. 184). This idea circles 
back to Saussure and the relational ontology of meanings; the researcher can only understand 
what something means when they know the meanings around the meaning, that is, the context.    
   
In terms of Ludvig Wittgenstein (1981), we could say that one has to be familiar with the 
particular “language-games” of the discursive field they are investigating. Indeed, Glynos and 
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Howarth propose that Wittgensteinian idea of family resemblance can help in applying theoretical 
concepts in empirical analysis (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 185). Family resemblance can be 
understood as the way in which concepts can be linked together as a group through overlapping 
similarities but without any one common definition (Wittgenstein, 1981). For example, the 
meaning of “game” is not any one feature but rather a collection of different, overlapping 
similarities between different games. In the logics approach, the idea of family resemblance helps 
in tracing logics, social logics in particular; while the logic of Eurocentrism, for example, can be 
said to refer to the priorisation of things considered “European”, this logic can manifest itself in 
many different contexts. Even though these different contexts would not seem to have anything 
in common, we could still identify them through recognizing the logic of Eurocentrism through the 
theoretical term. This way, family resemblance works as a bridge, both operationalizing 
theoretical concepts and generalizing specific observations.   
   
Altogether, the epistemological principles presented here highlight the role of the researcher in 
interpretative engagements. The aim of this research is not to access the “truth” of the meanings 
of enlargement discourse, because these meanings do not exist independently. Instead, I will 
critically assess the enlargement policy discourse from my own point of view, acknowledging my 
own role in this knowledge-producing project and aiming to articulate a persuasive narrative that 
helps to explain the enlargement discourse. This is concluded well by Kennedy and Thornberg, 
who describe the aims of the research process as follows:   
   
Ultimately, the validity of the research can be judged according to whether it provides new 
lenses with which to view social problems, new insights into possible solutions, practical 
wisdom to guide action, and/or empathic experiences to motivate advocacy. (Kennedy & 
Thornberg, 2018, p. 61)   
   
With these epistemological premises in mind, I will now move on to introduce the data and the 





4.2 Data   
 
The data of this thesis consists of four enlargement policy papers, produced by the 
European Commission (EC) and publicly available on EC’s website.25 Two different types of 
documents are included: enlargement strategy papers and regular, annual communications on 
enlargement from years 2019 and 2020 (see table 1). While enlargement strategies map out more 
general guidelines for enlargement policy, annual communications take stock of the situation in 
the candidate countries and their compliance with the accession criteria. Typically, the strategy 
papers are not as regular but identify problems and challenges in enlargement policy and attempt 
to provide responses. Annual communications, in turn, reflect these strategies and keep track how 
well they are implemented in practice, that is, how well the candidate countries progress. 
Communications are released as a sort of introduction to the yearly Enlargement package and to 
the country-specific reports it contains. 
   
Table 1: Data   
 
Document 
number   
Name of the document   Date   Type   
1   A credible enlargement perspective for and 
enhanced EU engagement with the Western 
Balkans (EC, 2018)   
6 February 2018 
  
   
Strategy paper   
2   2019 Communication on EU   
Enlargement Policy (EC,   
2019)   
29 May 2019   Annual  
communication   
3   Enhancing the accession process-  A credible EU 
perspective for the Western Balkans (EC, 
2020a)   
5 February 2020 
  
Strategy paper   
4   2020 
Communication on EU enlargement policy (EC,   
2020b)   
6 October 2020   Annual  
communication   
   
 
Similar enlargement strategies and communications on accession countries are available from as 
early as 1998 onwards. Regarding the scope of documents that was possible cover for this thesis, 
 
25  All documents available at European Commission’s website:  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en (Accessed 28 September 2021, Path: European Commission, 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Enlargement, Strategy and Reports)  
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the four most recent documents were selected since they represent recent developments in 
enlargement policy. Whilst other sources of data outside EC’s official documents, such as 
European parliament and media data might have yielded more diverse insights, data collection 
was limited to EC for two reasons. First, although the decision making ultimately rests on the 
Member States, the EC is the most powerful actor in setting enlargement policy guidelines (see 
chapter 2). Secondly, as argued by Elise Remling (2018a, 2018b) in her similar analyses on EU 
climate policy, enlargement strategies and communications by EC can be seen as a part of same 
genre chain, meaning that documents are systematically linked together intertextually. This allows 
for immanent critique, in which the data is “turned against itself” through comparison (ibid.). This 
way, the comparability of the data improves, in contrast to analysing exclusively one document or 
comparing very different types of documents. Here the research setting differs from many other 
studies that operationalize the logics approach by attempting to include a variety of data sources 
and forming a sort of horizontal snapshot of the discursive field at hand. By analysing EC 
documents exclusively, I hope to get a focused and comprehensive understanding of EC as a 
normative actor in enlargement politics. The comparison of different enlargement discourses by 
different institutions or other actors is left to be pursued by further research. Due to the focus of 
this thesis, the data collection was limited to the material that concern Western Balkan countries 
and therefore the parts of the documents that discuss other accession countries (mainly Turkey) 
were left aside in the analysis  
   
Before moving on to the analytical framework of the thesis, it should be highlighted that both 
types of policy documents are here understood through Carol Bacchi’s (2009)definition of policy 
as “problematising activity” that “includes but extends beyond laws and legistlation” (p. xi; ix). 
This means that policies, by nature, imply that something needs to be changed, that is, there is a 
problem that needs “fixing”. However, these problematisations are never neutral but endogenous 
to the policy-making context, articulating a particular understanding of the phenomena rooted in 
“deep-seated cultural assumptions” (ibid., p. x). According to Bacchi, then, critical policy research 
should shift focus from “solving” the assumed problems and pay attention to what’s the problem 
represented to be, that is, what issues are centered in governing processes and what are left in 
the margins, or not questioned at all.  
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4.3 Logics in practice: analysing policy papers    
   
To conduct a qualitative analysis on EU enlargement policy documents, this thesis follows the 
analytical framework of Elise Remling, developed for operationalizing the logics approach in policy 
analysis. As described in the previous chapter, the logics approach aims to explain the normative 
background of discourse through three logics. This is done by asking what the unquestioned 
“rules” of the policy are (social logic), how they are contested or institutionlised (political logic) 
and how they are argued for or maintained (fantasmatic logic). In addition, 
following Laclau and Mouffe, political logic can be understood through the rhetoric strategies 
of equivalence and difference (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Logics of equivalence links together 
elements to form a discursive chain, while the logics of difference describes the way in which 
elements are disarticulated from the common chain (Jacobs, 2018). In practice, logic of 
equivalence in this data could mean, for example, that certain policy issues were defined as 
crucial to enlargement policy, whereas logic of difference could manifest itself in exclusion or 
marginalization of some policies. The fantasmatic logic, too, can be seen as divided into 
two sublogics: beatific and horrific. In practice, the former typically lays out the path to “fulness” 
or some kind of utopian fantasy, provided that some obstacle is removed, or the proposed course 
of action is taken. Correspondingly, horrific fantasy summons “a looming disaster that steals the 
enjoyment of a prosperous future” if the proposed action is not taken (Remling, 2018b, p. 5). In 
enlargement discourse, these would be the parts of enlargement strategy claiming that something 
good or bad will happen if something is done or not. The three logics and their sublogics are 
illustrated in table 2.   
   
While the three logics and their sublogics are used as the main conceptual tools in analysing data, 
in Remling’s model they are supplemented with aiding concepts of assumptions and genre chains, 
borrowed from Norman Fairclough’s (2004) take on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This 
methodological choice stems from Remling’s own experience of analysing EU policy papers 
through the logics approach (Remling, 2018b). For her, tracing the fantasmatic logics turned out 
to be quite straight forward but defining the other two logics proved more challenging. According 
to Remling, this was due to the textual genre of policy documents which, in general, aims to 
present a coherent and ‘neutral’ narrative and therefore diminish any contradictions or 
competing ideas. Thus, the social and political logics in policy papers can be quite implicit. To 
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tackle this challenge and better access the underlaying assumptions in policy documents, Remling 
applies Fairclough’s division between three types of assumptions: existential, propositional and 
value assumptions. I also began with these aiding concepts as part of my analytical framework. I 
will discuss the applicability of the framework in my own analysis in the Chapters 5 and 6. The 
links between Fairclough’s three assumptions and the three principal logics are illustrated in table 
2.    
 
In practice, the empirical analysis in this thesis was done through multiple rounds of close reading 
and coding of the policy documents with Atlas.ti- software (Atlas.ti 8 for Mac). Committed to 
the retroductive/abductive approach, the coding was partly open, involving both initial 
conceptual codes, but leaving space for observations outside these codes (Remling, 2018b, p. 7). 
The initial categories are the three logics and sublogics in table 2. Once all documents were coded, 
the segments classified in each category were analysed in order to identify and name different 
logics. Empirical material was read through postcolonial theoretical concepts that were used in 
identifying and naming logics, as well as in spotting silences in the empirical material.  This way, 
the research problem was connected to a wider discussion on EU’s normative agency and 
contributing to post-colonialist agenda of de-centring Europe (Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013). While the 
clarification of epistemological premises earlier in this chapter has shown that the research 
setting of this thesis is in no way “neutral”, the intent behind adopting Remling’s analytical 
framework has been, methodologically, to be as transparent as possible. The aim is also to de-
mystify the interpretative coding process which is often under-reported in discourse analytic 
research. The three logics, supplemented with Fairclough’s aiding concepts, offer a systematic 
way to approach empirical material, while carving out space for critique and thus supporting me 










Table 2: Remling’s analytical framework (2018a, p. 11), supplemented with explanations and 
examples from the data of this thesis  
 
Logics   Sublogics   Aiding analytical  concepts 
(Fairclough, 2004)   
Examples   
Social= the   
rules of the 
game   
   Existential   
assumptions= what is 
concerned as an existing 
fact   
”The Western Balkans are part of Europe—the 
peoples of the EU and the region have a common 
heritage and history and future defined by shared 
opportunities and challenges” (EC, 2018, p. 1)   
      Value assumptions= what 
is assumed to be 
desirable or undesirable   
”It is of major importance to build more trust 
among all stakeholders and to enhance the 
accession process and make it more effective.” (EC 






instituted    
   Propositional 
assumptions=what 
“needs” to be done, i.e.   
assumptions of causality   
“in order for the countries to meet all membership 
conditions, including strengthening their 
democracies, more serious, comprehensive and 
convincing reforms are required in crucial areas, 
notably on the rule of law” (EC 2019, p. 1)   
   Logics 
of equivalance= 
what is included 
in the discursive 
chain   
   “Furthermore, for the accession process to be more 
effective, strategic communication will be 
instrumental. It is critical to raise awareness in the 
region of the opportunities closer integration and 
reforms entail, and to tackle malign third 
country influence.” (EC 2020a, p. 2)   
   Logics of 
difference= what 
is excluded from 
the discursive 
chain, what kind 
of antagonisms 
are created   
   “(T)here are still important bilateral 
disputesbetween countries in the region which 
remain to be solved. The EU will not accept to 
import these disputes and the instability they  could  
entail.” (EC 2018, p. 8)   
Fantasmatic   Beatific/ fantasy      ”Freedom of expression, as well as media freedom 
and pluralism, are pillars of democracy as they are 
essential  components  of  open  and  free  debate.” 
(EC, 2020b, p. 6) 
   Horrific/dystopia      ”The countries most advanced in the accession 
process risk falling behind on their stated ambitious 
goals if they do not also significantly step up efforts, 
in particular on fundamental reforms.” (EC 2019, p. 




5. Findings  
 
This chapter presents my findings from the empirical material. The next chapter, Discussion, 
reflects their implications in relation to earlier research and the theoretical framework. In this 
chapter, I will first describe the coding process and discuss how the method was adjusted to 
better fit the aim of the research. I will then move on to present my analysis that seeks to answer 
the research question: (how) is enlargement policy of the European Union (post)colonial? 
Following the logics approach, this question is approached from three different angles: what is 
taken for granted (social logic), what is sedimented or challenged (political logic) and how are 
these discourses argued for (fantasmatic logic). 
 
From the beginning of the coding process, it became evident that while it was easy to find 
different logics from the empirical material, most parts of the data could not be categorized under 
one code. In practice, different parts of text cannot be said to belong only to a certain logic but 
instead the codes overlap and often appear together. The following citation, for example, clearly 
includes both beatific and proportional assumptions, signaling fantasmatic and political logics:  
 
Together with improved regional cooperation, further efforts towards reconciliation 
are crucial to firmly anchor peace and ensure lasting stability in the region. The 
wounds of the 1990s still need time to heal. But 25 years on, it is time to address 
open issues with new vigour. All countries must unequivocally commit, in both word 
and deed, to overcoming the legacy of the past, by achieving reconciliation and 
solving open issues well before their accession to the EU. (EC, 2018, p. 6)  
 
Here, as in many other parts of the material, fantasmatic elements (lasting peace, stability, 
reconciliation) are used to justify for political logics, that is, what needs to be done (improve 
regional cooperation, address issues with new vigour, etc.). At the same time, the political logics, 
“things that must be done”, are themselves fantasmatic: “overcoming the legacy of the past” can 
be seen as a normative goal that this discourse attempts to institutionalise and the fantasy that is 
used as the “ideological fuel” to legitimize enlargement politics.   
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Also, while the categories of three assumptions (Fairclough, 2004) and aiding concepts (Remling, 
2018a; 2018b) were helpful in identifying logics from the material, it became evident that they 
were, too, hard to tell apart. Phrases such as “for the accession process to be more effective, 
strategic communication will be instrumental” can be interpreted both as propositional 
assumption (this needs to be done), but also involving logic of equivalence by adding new signifier 
(strategic communication) to the chain of equivalence (effective accession process). Furthermore, 
one could detect also a value assumption (accession should be effective), signaling the social logic 
of the discourse.  
 
Another observation was that many times the social logics (what is taken for granted) and the 
political logics worked together to produce the third, fantasmatic logic. This is often done by first 
painting the picture of the current situation (social logic, existential assumption) and then 
describing how things should be:  
 
Organised crime remains a very serious issue in the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
Important smuggling routes run through Turkey as well as the Western Balkans. 
Powerful criminal networks with an international reach continue to operate from 
and via these countries. -- Some countries can only demonstrate a handful if any 
final convictions for organised crime or money laundering in recent years. Such poor 
results show the ineffectiveness of criminal procedures, give strong signals of 
impunity, and contribute to the risk of criminal infiltration of the political and 
economic systems. Countries also need to increase significantly the seizure and 
confiscation of assets in both organised crime and corruption cases, and to tackle 
criminal groups more forcefully. (EC, 2019, p. 4)  
 
At first, the fact that the codes overlap so much raised a question about the applicability of this 
approach to the empirical material at hand. In building the theoretical and empirical framework, I 
expected that I could systematically code the whole data into separate logics and thus be able to 
conduct further, even quantitative analysis on how much of each logic can be found and how the 
different codes correlate. However, I soon realized that coding specific coder per 
phrase/paragraph was not only impossible but did not either help me to tap into what is most 
interesting, that is, the “spirit” of the different logics across the material. I understood that 
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instead of staring at the specific phrases, I needed to look beyond small units of text to get a fuller 
picture of the ideological horizon. The original way to process the material was thus replaced by 
treating the material more as a whole, “discursive blanket” or a narrative where different logics 
are interwoven. Thus, the three parts of the following analysis represent different aspects or 
dimensions of the material rather than separate parts of it.   
 
The empirical material is quite uniform in style and substance. All of the four documents begin 
with an introduction, where the meaning and importance of enlargement policy is argued for and 
the current situation described briefly. Here, the documents are contextualized by referring to 
earlier documents and other milestones of the enlargement process, such as summits and 
declarations. The enlargement policy is also put into a wider context by describing its meaning to 
the whole Union. The introduction parts proved to be the most fruitful for this analysis, since they 
are used to argue for and legitimize the enlargement policy. The language in these parts was also 
more explicitly ideological than in the other parts. The introductions are followed by general 
remarks on different policy areas and country-specific recommendations. These parts are more 
technical. As a general remark, the tone in the material is often passive; something needed to be 
done, but it is not often specified by whom.   
 
5.1 Social logics  
  
Overall, the style of the text does not leave much room for ambiguity or reflection but is 
declarative in nature and thus rich in social logics. According to my interpretation, social logics in 
this material were most distinguishable as certain mantras that were repeated throughout the 
documents. Stated as undisputed facts, these can be said to partly form the “unsaid normative 
background” of the discourse.   
  
Social logic 1: “credible” EU enlargement policy is a virtuous circle  
 
Perhaps the most significant and integrated mantra in these documents is the idea of enlargement 
as a virtuous circle, which was repeated (though in slightly different forms) in all the documents:  
  
This firm, merit-based prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans is in 
the Union’s very own political,  security  and  economic  interest.  In times of  
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increasing  global challenges  and  divisions,  it  remains  more  than  ever a  
geostrategic  investment in  a  stable, strong and united Europe. A credible accession 
perspective is the key incentive and driver of transformation in the region and thus  
enhances  our  collective  security  and  prosperity.  It is a key tool to promote 
democracy, rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights, which are also the 
main engines of economic integration and the essential anchor for fostering regional 
reconciliation and  stability.  Maintaining and enhancing  this  policy  is  thus  
indispensable  for the EU’s credibility, for the EU’ success and for the EU’s influence 
in the region and beyond-especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition. 
(EC, 2020a, p. 1) 
  
This mantra can be said to represent the main ideological narrative of the enlargement process: 
enlargement is first and foremost EU’s own interest that promotes three main goals: security, 
economical prosperity and EU’s influence in the world. These can be said to represent both 
existential and normative assumptions: the kind of “virtuous circle” of integration described in the 
citation is both believed to exist and to be desirable:  
 
 A core objective of the European Union’s engagement with the Western Balkans is 
to prepare them to meet all the requirements of membership. This includes 
supporting fundamental democratic, rule of law and economic reforms and 
alignment with core European values. This will in turn foster solid and accelerated 
economic growth and social convergence. (EC, 2020a, p. 2)  
  
 The logic of enlargement as a virtuous circle ties skillfully together the different interests, fears 
and goals of the EU, concluding that “credible accession perspective” is in fact “indispensable” for 
the EU.  Enlargement is not only a sectoral policy goal, but “part and parcel of the larger strategy 
to strengthen the Union by 2025” (EC, 2018, p. 1).   
  
Although the interconnectedness between different security, economical and geostrategic 
interests is here understood as a social logic, it can be also approached through the political logics 
of equivalence; different signifiers are connected to the discursive chain of enlargement. 
Enlargement is not only about geographical expansion, but also about security, stability, economy 
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and so on. Besides EU’s own, pro-active policy, enlargement is here also defined as a response or 
reaction to “increasing global challenges and divisions” (EC, 2020a, p. 1). The assumption that 
there is such challenges and divisions serves well in legitimating enlargement as a “geostrategic 
investment in a stable, strong and united Europe” (ibid.). This example also demonstrates well 
how social and fantasmatic logic are intertwined in the empirical material.  
 
 
Social logic 2: joining the EU is a choice  
  
Another recurring mantra is that joining EU is an available choice for the candidates: “Joining the 
EU is a choice, and one that requires sharing the principles, values and goals the Union seeks to 
promote in its neighborhood and beyond” (EC, 2018, p. 9). This is often paired with statements 
such as “the EU accession process continues to be built on established criteria, fair and rigorous 
conditionality, and the principle of own merits” (EC, 2019, p. 10) or “accession is and will remain a 
merit-based process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each country” (EC, 
2018, p. 2). These mantras discursively construct the enlargement process and EU membership as 
a technical, well-established process where joining the Union is equally possible for every 
country, just one “choice” away. The narrative of choice also stresses the normative or moral 
aspect of enlargement: the “choice for Europe” should be sincere, absolute and irreversible:  
  
--joining the EU is a choice. It needs political and societal consensus and the support 
of the hearts and minds of the people. (EC, 2018, p. 3)  
  
[Joining the EU] is a generational choice, based on fundamental values, which each 
country must embrace more actively, from their foreign and regional policies right 
down to what children are taught at school. (ibid., p. 2) 
  
Accession to the European Union is a process requiring and supporting fundamental 
reform and political and economic change in the countries aspiring to join, and 
also to demonstrate the ability to take on the shared responsibilities as a Member 
State of the EU. It is not moving on autopilot but must reflect an active societal 
choice on their part to reach and respect the highest European standards and values. 
(EC, 2020a, p. 3)  
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Success in accession process is said to be entirely in the hands of candidate countries 
and dependent on candidate countries’ ability to make this “generational choice” (EC, 2018, p. 2) 
between past and future, backwardness and modernisation.   
  
With strong political will, the delivery of real and sustained reforms, and definitive 
solutions to disputes with neighbours, they could potentially be ready for 
membership in a 2025 perspective. This perspective is extremely ambitious. Whether 
it is achieved will depend fully on the objective merits and results of each country. (EC, 
2018, p. 2, emphasis added) 
 
The enlargement perspective of the Western Balkans is first and foremost in the 
hands of the countries themselves. (EC, 2018, p. 9) 
 
 Looking at how the enlargement criteria has changed and become stricter during the past 
decades (Dimitrova & Kortenska, 2019) and how slow the Western Balkan accession has been, it is 
evident that progress in “EU path” is not only about the merits of each country. There are many 
other variables that affect the negotiations, notably EU’s own internal and external interests and 
developments. At the same time, however, it is often stressed that the EU, (member states and 
the Commission) is expected to better fulfill its responsibilities and that it should take more 
responsibility in advancing the accession process. The different agencies will be discussed further 
in the next chapter. This is just one example of how the material is filled with different social logics 
that sometimes complement and sometimes contradict each other.  
  
  
Social logic 3: EU is committed, and progress has been made  
  
One of the most unquestioned messages in the material is that the enlargement perspective has 
had EU’s “univocal support” since the Thessaloniki summit in 2003 and that ever since, progress 
has been made. The documents build a narrative of continuous progress by listing 
every achievement there has been and describing how unified, determined and systematic the 
Union has been in advancing accession:  
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The EU has long been strongly engaged in the region. From the Thessaloniki 
European Council in 2003, it has supported the future of the region as an integral 
part of the EU. Since then, the European perspective of the region has helped the 
countries to achieve overall political and economic reforms with improved 
democratic processes. Visa liberalisation and much improved regional cooperation 
are fostering more open societies. (EC, 2018, p. 1)  
  
The EU’s enhanced engagement with and commitment to the region over the last 
year is already yielding concrete and significant results. North Macedonia not only 
continued its ambitious reform agenda, but also reached a historic agreement with 
Greece resolving a 27- year old name dispute. This, together with the bilateral 
agreement with Bulgaria, is an example of how to strengthen 
good neighbourly relations for the entire region, and testimony to the power of 
attraction of the European perspective. (EC, 2019, pp. 1-2, emphasis added) 
  
The narrative of progress is coupled with a narrative of commitment that is repeatedly required 
from both parties, the EU and the candidates. Especially the devotion of the candidate 
countries to the process is questioned throughout the material, and often identified as an obstacle 
for progress:  
  
All countries must unequivocally commit, in both word and deed, to overcoming the 
legacy of the past, by achieving reconciliation and solving open issues well before 
their accession to the EU. (EC, 2018, p. 17) 
  
All political leaders in the region must live up to the reform expectations of their 
citizens and leave no doubt as to their strategic orientation and commitment to join 
the EU. (EC, 2019, p. 2)  
  
An even stronger focus on meeting the interim benchmarks in the rule of law area is 
vital. These requirements and conditions are already clearly spelt out by the 
Commission in its regular reporting. The countries' leaders must now tackle the 
existing challenges forcefully and with clearer commitment. (EC, 2018, p. 8) 
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On the other hand, the EU’s lack of commitment is also criticised, notably in the latest 
documents. Lack of “unwavering” commitment to the enlargement process is seen as a threat to 
the Union’s credibility:  
  
For the accession process to regain credibility on both sides and deliver to its full 
potential, it needs to rest on solid trust, mutual confidence and clear commitments 
on both sides. It means the Western Balkans leaders must deliver more credibly on 
their commitment to implement the fundamental reforms required,--. EU Member 
States and citizens have legitimate concerns and need to be reassured of the 
unequivocal political will of the countries, proven by structural, tangible reforms. --. 
This also means the European Union delivers on its unwavering commitment to 
a merit based process. --All parties must abstain from misusing outstanding issues in 
the EU accession process. In the same vein, Member States and institutions must 
speak with one voice in the region, sending clear signals of support and 
encouragement, and speaking clearly and honestly on shortcomings when they 
occur. (EC, 2020a, p. 2) 
  
As the last sentence of the citation indicate, credibility is understood to require unity: the EU is 
expected to speak with one voice. Interestingly, clarity and honesty are also linked to credibility. 
  
Overall, “commitment” and “recommitment” are important signifiers in the enlargement 
discourse, although their concrete meaning is quite vague. Together with verbs such as “support”, 
they seem to be used to cover over lack of concrete results. Furthermore, the recurrent use of 
expressions such as “reconfirmed” and “recommitted” illustrates how the maintaining of the 
enlargement discourse requires repeating performance of commitment:  
  
At the EU-Western Balkans summit, which took place in Sofia in May 2018, EU 
leaders reaffirmed their unequivocal support for the European perspective of the 
Western Balkans, and the Western Balkan partners recommitted to this perspective 
as their firm strategic choice. (EC, 2019, p. 1) 
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 At the EU-Western Balkans Summit on 6 May 2020, the EU leaders reaffirmed the 
Union’s determination to intensify further its engagement with the region and 
welcomed the pledge of the Western Balkan partners to carry out necessary reforms 
thoroughly and vigorously. (EC, 2020b, p.1) 
 
The European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy of February 2018 provided a 
major boost for the region’s European path. It reconfirmed the future of the Western 
Balkans as an integral part of the EU. It reiterated that the prospect of EU 
membership based on meeting firm, established criteria is in the Union’s very own 
political, security and economic interest. It confirmed the significant progress the 
region has made both on reforms and towards overcoming the legacy of war and 
conflict. (2019, p. 1) 
  
5.2 Political logics  
 
Overall, political logics could be seen as a sort of “meta-logics” of this material. As a policy paper, 
its purpose is to assess and guide enlargement policies and therefore to sediment a 
certain understanding of the accession process while challenging and framing some aspects of the 
existing situation as problematic (Bacchi, 2009). In tracing political logics, I paid specific attention 
to parts that argued how things ought to be, as well as parts that built chains of equivalence and 
difference, as seeking to articulate and institutionalise certain elements as connected and some as 
disconnected. 
 
Political logic 1: simultaneous logics of equivalence and difference  
  
Logics of equivalance and difference (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987) as aiding analytical concepts helped 
me to discover what is one of the most interesting feature of the empirical material. This is the 
material’s tendency to present contradictory statements that simultaneously include and exclude 
the Western Balkan states and region from the EU/ Europe. This was visible in the material as 
simultaneous logics of equivalence and difference, that I call here a discursive double move. In the 
following, I illustrate this double move with examples from the material.  
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Perhaps the most common form of the simultaneous exclusion and inclusion is how the Western 
Balkans region is simultaneously placed both in Europe/EU and outside or on its way to 
Europe/EU. “European perspective” and “European path” are common expressions in the 
material, placing candidate countries somehow into the European space (or in relation to it) while 
simultaneously pointing out that they are not quite there yet. There is also an interesting temporal 
aspect to be found: the region is seen as historically part of Europe and its future is in Europe, but 
right now it is somewhere else:   
  
The  Western  Balkans  are part  of  Europe,  geographically  surrounded  by  EU 
Member States. The peoples of the EU and the region have a common heritage and 
history and a future  defined  by  shared  opportunities  and  challenges. (EC, 2018, p. 
1, emphasis added)  
  
An investment in the Western Balkans is an investment in Europe. Investments will 
only increase if economic governance is strengthened, and structural reforms 
pursued to increase competitiveness. (EC, 2018, p. 12) 
  
Interestingly, it is many times stressed how the WB6 countries have already benefitted from their 
accession processes, their journey towards becoming European, as if seeking legitimization for the 
lack of progress in becoming actual members:  
  
Everyday life in the Western Balkans should progressively become closer to life 
within the European Union. Ultimately, citizens yearn to live in countries that are 
prosperous and equal, where the rule of law is strong and corruption is rooted out. 
This strategy sets out how with increased support from the EU, including through 
participation in certain Union policies and programmes, the Western Balkan 
countries can already benefit from an increased stability and prosperity that will in 
turn facilitate progress on their European paths. (EC, 2018, p. 2)  
  
Although some progress is recognized, a clear distinction is made between the current state of 
the candidate countries and “European standards”. The logic of difference between the EU and 
the Balkans is produced by highlighting this gap:  
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Despite some acceleration of growth, job creation and increases in income in the last 
years, the countries are still lagging behind in reforming their economic structures 
and improving competitiveness. (EC, 2019, p. 7) 
  
The European perspective of the Western Balkans is clear and unambiguous and the 
conditions and criteria for EU membership are well established. -- Much work lies 
ahead for the countries concerned to be in a position to meet these criteria. 
Governments must ensure more inclusive reform processes that bring all 
stakeholders and society at large on board. (EC, 2018, p. 18)  
 
We can also compare the following two extracts from 2019 and 2020 and see that there is 
consistency in in the way the differences between the EU and the Western Balkans are discussed 
  
The Western Balkans have taken important steps in recent years to modernise the 
legal and institutional framework regarding the fight against terrorism. Operational 
cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies has continued to improve and 
intensify. -- Nevertheless, most countries still need to step up efforts to address the 
issue of returning foreign fighters and to prevent extremism and radicalisation, 
including in prisons. Online monitoring and response capacities need to be enhanced. 
Pro-active tracing of financial flows should be anchored in a more strategic approach 
against money laundering and terrorism financing. (EC, 2019, p. 4)  
 
One positive element has been that the Western Balkans’ operational cooperation 
with EU Member States and EU agencies has continued to improve and intensify in 
the fight against terrorism and radicalisation leading to violent extremism, as well as 
migration and border management. However, credible progress in the rule of law 
area remains a significant challenge, which often correlates with a lack of political 
will, continuing existence of certain elements of state capture, limited progress on 
judicial independence, institutional resistance and an increasingly difficult 




Throughout the material, such narrative of insufficient action is repeated. The political logic that is 
being constructed is that the candidate countries have not made enough progress - the progress is 
often “limited”. 26Hereby the region is both included by setting the fantasmatic future of the 
candidates inside the EU and excluded by stating that they are not there yet.  As mentioned earlier 
in the context of social logic, there is an assumption or at least a mantra of achieved progress 
decoupled with the political logic of insufficient action:  
  
While none meets these criteria today, the region has come a long way since the end 
of the 1990s. Overall, significant progress has been made both on reforms 
and on overcoming the devastating legacy of war and conflict. But in order for the 
countries to meet all membership conditions and strengthen their democracies, 
comprehensive and convincing reforms are still required in crucial areas, notably on 
the rule of law, competitiveness, and regional cooperation and reconciliation. (EC, 
2018, p. 3) 
  
Another example of the double discursive move of inclusion and exclusion is how the Western 
Balkans region is simultaneously portrayed both as one, homogeneous entity and a diverse group 
of individual countries. The region is understood to share such similar characteristics, challenges, 
and possibilities that it can be addressed and described as one actor, “the Western Balkans”: “The 
Western Balkans have taken important steps in recent years to modernise the legal and 
institutional framework regarding the fight against terrorism” (EC, 2019, p. 4).  At the same time, 
however, the merits and shortcomings of each individual country in all the different policy 
areas are highlighted and compared against each other. This sort of competitive setting is often 
created in the documents by first stating a shared principle or a policy goal and then ranking 




26 In the material, the progress in different policy areas is often evaluated through a scale of “no progress”, “limited 
progress”, “some progress” or “good/credible progress” and “significant progress” “Objective progress” is often used 
to signal the commitment to standardized, merit-based process. 
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In the coming years, all Western Balkan countries will have the chance to move 
forward on their respective European paths, on the basis of their own merits and at 
the speed at which they achieve them. Montenegro and Serbia are the current front-
runners in the process and the following subsection illustrates the remaining 
milestones on their paths. Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
are making significant progress on their European path and the Commission is ready 
to prepare recommendations to open accession negotiations, on the basis of fulfilled 
conditions. -- With sustained effort and engagement, Bosnia and Herzegovina could 
become a candidate for accession. Kosovo has an opportunity for sustainable 
progress through implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and 
to advance on its European path once objective circumstances allow. (EC, 2018, p. 7, 
emphasis added) 
  
A well-functioning and independent judiciary, where decisions are effectively 
implemented, is of crucial importance for the rule of law. Albania made important 
progress towards reforming its judicial system, which continues on schedule. -
- However, throughout the Western Balkans region, reforms continue to suffer from 
a slow pace of change in judicial culture. In Serbia, constitutional amendments 
intended to align the constitution with European standards for the judiciary have not 
yet been passed. (EC, 2019, p. 4) 
  
The proper functioning of democratic institutions remains a key challenge in 
most countries.-- In the Western Balkans, constructive dialogue across the political 
spectrum, notably within the parliaments, remains to be established. Counter-
productive parliament boycotts such as in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia remain of 
concern. Citizens’ protest demanding reforms have increased. Mediation and 
dialogue mechanisms, such as those offered by the European Parliament, could be 
used, for example in Serbia. (EC, 2019, p. 3) 
  
 The Western Balkans -- continue to show widespread corruption. Robust results in 
the fight against corruption are needed to mitigate the real threats to democratic 
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structures and for a stable and transparent business environment. Progress in 
successfully fighting high and medium level corruption varies across the region 
although the overall pace has slowed down and the track record in most countries is 
far from meeting the requirements for membership. -- One positive sign of 
engagement is the agreement of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and North Macedonia to participate in the Sofia priority action on 
monitoring of trials in high-level corruption and organised crime cases; further 
discussion in this regard is needed with Serbia. (EC, 2020b, p. 5) 
The historic agreement reached with Greece put an end to a longstanding dispute 
and is an example of reconciliation for the region and Europe as a whole. (EC, 2019, 
p. 15) 
  
Thus, the enlargement process of the WB6 countries is pictured both as individual “paths” as well 
as a common race between countries. Here, the destinies of each candidate country are 
independent… 
  
The countries may catch up or overtake each other depending on progress made --
Accession is and will remain a merit-based process fully dependent on the objective 
progress achieved by each country. (EC, 2018, p. 2) 
  
…as well as interdependent: 
 
All countries must abstain from misusing outstanding issues in the EU accession 
process. As a matter of principle, the frontrunners on the EU path have a strategic 
interest in being advocates, not spoilers, of the aspirations of their neighbours. The 
countries of the region are inter- dependent and will progress faster if they help each 
other along the way. (EC, 2018, p. 7) 
  
 These contradictory double moves of inclusion and exclusion create an impression of uncertainty 
and ambiguity in the material. This ambiguity is further enforced by open-endedness of the 
accession process. While it is repeated many times that the process is clear, transparent, and well-
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established, the EU reserves all the rights to control the accession. The enlargement process 
includes moving goals such as the “interim benchmarks”:  
  
Once the interim benchmarks are met, the setting of closing benchmarks will provide 
an opportunity for the EU to clearly set out the rule of law requirements that 
negotiating countries will ultimately have to meet to be ready for EU membership in 
this crucial area. (EC, 2019, p. 5) 
 
Setting the closing benchmarks will provide an opportunity for the EU to clearly spell 
out the requirements Montenegro will have to meet prior to the closing of these two 
chapters. (EC, 2020b, p. 20) 
 
Political logic 2: agency  
Another political logic that is interesting for this analysis is the logics of agency. How is agency 
institutionalised or contested in the documents? Who is expected to act and how? The different 
roles of the EU and the candidate countries in the enlargement process are visible in how their 
responsibilities are described. The EU “supports”, “monitors”, “surveils”, “gives signals” and “is 
committed”. From these documents, the EU emerges as a stable and united actor that oversees 
and guides the reforms in the candidate countries in a consistent and sustained manner. The EU 
sets the rules and it is best for everyone if they are followed as thoroughly as possible:  
An early alignment with the EU acquis, together with an effective public internal 
control system, is required to reduce wasteful use of resources, fraud and 
corruption. (EC, 2019, p. 6) 
However, it is stressed that the EU has a fair share of responsibilities in the accession process. In 
fact, successful enlargement is the historical responsibility of the EU, both for its own future and 
credibility and for the Western Balkans region, as seen already in the context of social logic of 
“virtuous circle”.   
The EU must stick to its commitments and respond clearly and positively to the 
objective results achieved by the countries in relation to the conditions it has set. 
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This is a strategic investment not only in the region’s future, but first and foremost in 
the EU’s own political and economic interest. (EC, 2019, p. 11) 
The Union must live up to its commitments and give credit where credit is due. 
Failure to reward objective progress by moving to the next stage of the European 
path would damage the EU’s credibility throughout the region and beyond. (EC, 
2019, p. 2, emphasis added). 
The documents also repeatedly underline how much the EU has done and continues to do for the 
region. This can be seen as a proof of commitment and devotion but also as a plea for gratitude 
and, perhaps, legitimicy for the EU’s policies and the enlargement process as such.  
The EU, while being seriously affected itself by this crisis, has provided extensive 
support to the efforts of the governments in particular in the Western Balkans to 
address those challenges.-- The EU-Western Balkans cooperation and support from 
the EU goes far beyond what any other partner has provided to the Western Balkans 
reflecting the region’s strategic anchoring. (EC, 2020b, p. 1, emphasis added)  
However, there is differentiation between what is expected from different institutions and actors 
within the Union. The agency of the Commission is naturally active and dominant, as this material 
is produced by them  (the word “commission” is mentioned 248 times in the documents). Many of 
the aims and interests of the Commission are clearly visible and they are not openly contested.  
The Commission will further extend support to reconciliation initiatives, including 
those that address transitional justice and seek to overcome the legacy of recent 
conflict. There will be a continuation of support for the work of Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals, and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. The 
Commission will also explore how best to further the work of International 
Committee for the Red Cross and the International Commission on Missing Persons 
in fostering regional cooperation to resolve the issue of missing persons and examine 
what more can be done to reduce the scourge of landmines. (EC, 2018, p. 15) 
The voice and the standing of the Commission are also visible in how the other actors are 
presented. The Member States, in particular, get their share of criticism: according to this 
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material, they should be more active and constructive in the accession process and refrain from 
using enlargement for advancing their own interests.  For the Commission, Member States’ role is 
also to act as peer supporters, sharing their knowledge on how to become good Europeans:  
There is great benefit in increased Member States' and experts' contributions to 
support and bring pressure to bear on reform implementation. More detailed rule of 
law assessments should be undertaken and advisory missions extended to the whole 
Western Balkans, building on the experience of the earlier advisory missions. 
Monitoring of implementation and enforcement should be enhanced including 
through more systematic, case-based peer-reviews organised by the Commission 
with the participation of Member State experts. (EC, 2018, p. 10) 
Member states and their individual interests and bilateral disputes are seen as a threat to 
enlargement and the unity of the EU in general, which is clearly the Commission’s priority. This 
“dystopia” of fragmented or polarised EU will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
The Western Balkan countries, in turn, are expected to “step up” or “redouble” their efforts. They 
are portrayed as insufficient, incomplete, and too passive and they are expected to reform, align, 
adapt and implement. It is very clear that the progress—or the lack thereof—is understood to be 
on the shoulders of the candidate countries and dependent on their ability to fundamentally 
reform the structures of their societies:  
It is now up to the countries' authorities, with the support of their societies, to take 
ownership and deliver on the well-known conditions for accession. (EC, 2018, p. 3) 
All the Western Balkan countries must now urgently redouble their efforts, address 
vital reforms and complete their political, economic and social transformation, 
bringing all stakeholders on board from across the political spectrum and from civil 
society. (EC, 2018, p. 2) 
For the process to move forward, accession candidates need as a matter of priority 
to deliver more swiftly genuine and sustainable results on key issues. (EC, 2019, p. 
11) 
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As described earlier, the candidate countries are also differentiated as individual countries. Agency 
is also given to different actors within the countries. For example, the leaders of the region are 
expected to “take full ownership and lead by example”(EC, 2018, p. 7), “tackle the existing 
challenges forcefully and with clearer commitment” (ibid., p. 8)  and “take concrete steps to 
promote an environment conducive to reconciliation” (EC, 2020b, p. 25). They “must leave no 
doubt as to their strategic orientation and commitment”(EC, 2019, p. 2) as “it is they that 
ultimately must assume responsibility for making this historical opportunity a reality” (EC, 2018, p. 
18). These demands signal some level of mistrust towards the leaders of the region and their 
commitment to the “European perspective”. Interestingly, the “leaders” are also addressed here 
as one, coherent group.  
The role of opposition and the civic society are also recognised as significant for the enlargement 
process. Opposition, in particular, is expected to “perform” their “constructive role” in the spirit of 
democracy, but nevertheless contribute to the “pro-European consensus”:  
Opposition parties, which also bear significant responsibility in shaping the future of 
their countries, should have the possibility to fully perform their role and engage in 
democratic processes-- Governments need to ensure that the opposition has the 
possibility to fully perform its role within the existing frameworks. And the 
opposition needs to engage constructively in the democratic process. (EC, 2019, p. 3) 
Governments need to ensure that the opposition has adequate conditions to 
perform its democratic control function. At the same time, the opposition needs to 
engage in the democratic processes. (EC, 2020b, p. 11) 
Albania: Opposition parties, most of which relinquished their parliamentary 
mandates in February 2019, should constructively re-engage in the democratic 
institutions and commit to a broad European consensus. (EC, 2019, p. 15) 
Serbia’s political scene is marked increasingly by polarisation and a shrinking space 
for diverging political opinions. There is an urgent need to create more space for 
genuine cross-party debate, in order to forge a broad pro-European consensus, 
which is vital for the country’s progress on its EU path. (EC, 2019, p. 14) 
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The last quotation is an interesting example of the kind of contradictory double standards that can 
be detected from the material: a candidate country is expected to promote liberal democracy as 
long as all the actors are “pro-European”. Similarly, the citizens or the peoples of the candidate 
countries are expected to be pro-European and to understand that the EU membership is for their 
own benefit:  
It is now up to the countries' authorities, with the support of their societies, to take 
ownership and deliver on the well-known conditions for accession.-- Ultimately, the 
region's citizens will judge their own governments on whether or not they are willing 
and able to deliver on their European ambitions. (EC, 2018, p. 3) 
-- There can be no ambiguity by leaders about where the Western Balkans belong 
and the direction in which they are heading. This is necessary to secure and sustain 
the support of their own and of EU citizens, and must be reflected in leaders’ 
communications and outreach to citizens. (ibid., p. 3, emphasis added) 
By providing clear and tangible incentives of direct interest to citizens, the EU can 
encourage real political will and reward results arising from demanding reforms and 
the process of political, economic and societal change. (EC, 2020a, p. 5) 
Although there is a clear distinction and a division of labor between the EU and the Western 
Balkan countries, the documents also construct enlargement process as a joint effort that proves 
Western Balkans’ compatibility with the EU:  
--both sides should show more leadership and live up to their respective 
commitments in public, while coming in more directly on matters of concern. (EC, 
2020a, p. 3) 
The ongoing pandemic has clearly demonstrated how the EU and the Western 
Balkans are tackling common challenges together. (EC, 2020b, p. 1) 
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In fact, it seems that although the responsibility to reform and change is appointed to the Western 
Balkan countries, there is an assumption that these countries need the EU to fullfill their fantasies 
or “European perspectives”:  
The EU remains the main external driver of growth and jobs in the Western Balkans. 
The full adherence of any foreign economic activity to EU values, norms and 
standards is key for the region’s success. (EC, 2019, p. 11) 
Political logic 3: historical window of opportunity  
As political logics is here understood as ways in which something is contested or institutionalised, 
an important finding was the way in which enlargement is temporally framed. Based on the two 
first documents, in particular,n there is a “historical window of opportunity” and a new 
“momentum” that both the Union and the candidate countries should take as a matter of urgency: 
“to make the ambitious best-case scenario a reality, action must be taken now” (EC, 2018, p. 3).  
This rush can be seen as a response to the recent enlargement fatique and a lack of motivation 
and commitment on both sides. Interestingly, the two more recent documents do not include any 
references to “historical opportunity” – perhaps due to the pandemic. 
The Western Balkan countries now have a historic window of opportunity to firmly 
and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union. (EC, 2018, P. 2) 
The Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy of February 2018 created new 
momentum across the region and greater engagement by the EU and its Member 
States. Still, the uptake by the countries concerned of this historic window of 
opportunity varies. (EC, 2019, p. 11) 
This welcome progress achieved now calls for the Union’s concrete and fast action. 
The EU has the opportunity, and a strong self-interest, to lock in long-term positive 
momentum across the region. The Union must live up to its commitments and give 
credit where credit is due. Failure to reward objective progress by moving to the next 
stage of the European path would damage the EU’s credibility throughout the region 
and beyond. A tepid response to historic achievements and substantial reforms 
would undermine stability, seriously discourage much needed further reforms and 
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affect work on sensitive bilateral issues like the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. 
Strategically, it would only help the EU’s geopolitical competitors to root themselves 
on Europe’s doorstep. (EC, 2019, p. 2) 
The latter quotation demonstrates well how the political logic of urgency or historical opportunity 
has both beatific (long-term positive momentum) and horrific (damage to EU’s credibility; 
geopolitical competitors on Europe’s doorstep) aspects. It also links enlargement agenda to the 
wider geopolitical and geostrategic agenda, institutionalising enlargement as a key policy for 
tackling contemporary challenges in those sectors.  
Although the tone of urgency is visible thorough the material, there is simultaneously a counter-
narrative arguing that neither the Union nor the candidates are not ready yet for further 
enlargement. This is particularly true for the new enlargement methodology (2020a) that calls for 
profound reforms in the enlargement policy:  
Maintaining and enhancing this (enlargement) policy is thus indispensable for the 
EU’s credibility, for the EU’ success and for the EU’s influence in the region and 
beyond - especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition. However, it is 
also clear that the effectiveness of the overall accession process and of its 
implementation must be improved further. While the strategic direction of the policy 
remains more valid than ever, it must get much better traction on the ground. (EC, 
2020a, p. 1) 
The new methodology promises to be “forward-looking” and make the accession process more 
“dynamic“ and “efficient”. At the same time, however, it can be seen as an attempt to slow down 
the pace of the process as it aims to “strengthen revisability” and ensure that the reforms in 
candidate countries are “sustainable” by introducing sanctions for backsliding or stagnation. These 
simultaneous logics of urgency and the slowing down of the accession process can be also seen as 
a discursive double move as those detected earlier.    
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5.3 Fantasmatic logics  
Fantasmatic logics in the material appeared as the beatific fantasies and horrific dystopias that the 
enlargement policy is legitimised with and argued for. As a general observation, fantasies and 
dystopias often occur together in the material as if they were two sides of the same coin. If the 
candidate countries converged with the EU’s agenda and norms, there was a promise of 
fantasmatic future for the region. If “European perspective” and norms were ignored or there 
were signs of stagnation, dystopic images of backwardness were painted. Inspired by this finding, 
the two first of the three most important fantasmatic logics are here introduced as three pairs of 
fantasies and dystopias.  
Fantasmatic logic 1: progress vs. stagnation  
Perhaps the most distinguishable fantasmatic logic in the material is the juxtaposition between 
progress and stagnation. Progress is discursively linked to such things as modernisation, efficiency, 
stability, peace, digitalisation, transparency of governance, freedom of speech, 
professionalistation of civil servants, good neighbourly relations and economic integration. These 
were things that the accession process and the convergence with EU norms and rules were 
expected to bring to the region.   
It is essential that the Western Balkans are included in the EU's efforts to embrace 
technological change for them to be able to benefit from digital tools, ensuring a 
prosperous and sustainable future for their citizens. (EC, 2018, p. 14) 
Predictability and conditionality will also be enhanced through greater transparency. 
To ensure sustainability of reforms and facilitate monitoring of implementation, all 
key reforms in the countries should be carried out in a fully transparent and inclusive 
way, with key stakeholder involvement. For its part, the European Union should 
endeavour to make the process more transparent, with wider publication of key 
documents. (EC, 2020a, p. 6) 
The Western Balkans should invest more in their younger generation, our future EU 
citizens, and give them a perspective for the future, not the past. (EC, 2018, p. 7) 
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Dystopia of stagnation or backwardness, in turn, is often present when the current situation in the 
region is described. It is often connected to corruption, protectionism, insecurity, 
underdevelopment or “falling behind”, and violence among other things.  The documents also use 
this dystopic imaginary to describe what is in store for the candidate countries if they do not 
follow their “European path”.   
A slow pace of change in judicial culture continues throughout the Western Balkans 
region without sufficient commitment to the principle of judicial independence and 
respect for court decisions. (EC, 2020b, p. 5) 
The investment climate remained largely unchanged and is characterised by weak 
rule of law, the lack of adequate enforcement of State aid rules, an entrenched grey 
economy, poor access to finance for businesses and low level of regional integration 
and connectivity. State interference in the economy persists.  (EC, 2020b, p. 14) 
The countries most advanced in the accession process risk falling behind on their 
stated ambitious goals if they do not also significantly step up efforts, in particular on 
fundamental reforms. (EC, 2019, p. 2) 
The Western Balkans and Turkey continue to show instances of widespread 
corruption. Progress in successfully fighting high and medium level corruption varies 
across the region. While some countries, such as North Macedonia and Albania, have 
made progress, the track record remains unconvincing in most countries and far 
from meeting the requirements for membership. (EC, 2019, p. 4) 
An interesting observation about the fantasy of progress is that there seems to be an implicit 
expectation of modernisation or progress as something technical, professional, and clinical as 
opposed to corrupted or political. It seems that development itself is here understood as a 
somewhat neutral form of expertise that the EU can provide.  This fantasy is polished from any 
irrelevant local or bilateral political disputes and the main message is clear: development 
according to EU’s “perspective” is in everyone’s interest. This model development is one-
directional in two senses: it comes from the EU to the region and it is expected to be linear, that is, 
irreversible and “sustainable”.  
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Managerial accountability and professionalisation of the civil service still need to be 
ensured in most countries and excessive politicisation addressed. Transparent and 
merit-based procedures for recruitment, promotion, demotion and dismissal need to 
be embedded in the legislative frameworks and consistently implemented across 
public services. (EC, 2020b, p. 13) 
Public administration reform is essential for improving governance at all levels. This 
includes the quality and accountability of the administration, professionalisation of 
the civil service and de-politicisation, sound public financial management, and 
ensuring quality services to citizens and businesses. (EC, 2020b, p. 6) 
Interestingly, also the areas of development in the enlargement policy itself are understood in 
quite technical terms. This is visible f.ex in how the aims of the new methodology are described:  
[E]ffectiveness of the accession process and its implementation must be improved 
further. While the strategic direction of the policy remains more valid than ever, it 
must get much better traction on the ground -- process needs to be better equipped 
to deal with structural weaknesses in the countries. (EC, 2020a, p. 1) 
The tendency to use technical language is perhaps a way to reduce feelings of uncertainty and lack 
of control over the process. It can also be part of a more general understanding of “political” as 
something messy or unprofessional. On the other hand, it would be wrong to describe the fantasy 
discourse of progress by the EU as apolitical neither explicitly nor implicitly. As discussed earlier in 
the context of social logic of the EU as a choice, there is an assumption according to which 
accession is an “active societal choice -- to reach and respect the highest European standards and 
values” (EC, 2020a, p. 3).  In fact, the new methodology states also that “it is time to put the 
political nature of the process front and centre” (ibid.) and that “the commitment of the Member 
States to share a common future with the Western Balkans as full members of the Union is a 
significant political and not simply technical undertaking” (ibid., emphasis added). These 
simultaneous narratives of enlargement as a technical undertaking and as a fundamental political 
choice begs the question of what is meant by “political” in this context. Looking at how the 
“political” is framed in the documents, it seems that "political nature of the process” is 
instrumentalised and used to refer to the diverse ways in which the accession process should be 
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advanced through different channels. On the other hand, political is used to describe the accession 
process as an opposite to “autopilot” or “technical undertaking” (ibid.), that is, a deeper societal 
choice of principles. In other words, “political nature” of enlargement is not used to construct the 
enlargement process as political in the sense that its substance, principles or institutionalisation 
could be questioned.  
If the EU is the one that is expected to fullfill the fantasy of progress in the Western Balkans 
region, there is a horrific counter dystopia of “third countries” and their influence. This refers to 
Russia, China and other actors that have interests and agency in the region and are seen as threats 
or competitors. The horrific third-party discourse is clearly a rising trend; in 2018 its not 
mentioned at all, 2019 only once and in the 2020 enlargement methodology and communication 
already multiple times. 
Increasing business and investment activity by third countries in the Western Balkans 
frequently neglects socio-economic and financial sustainability and EU rules on public 
procurement, and may result in high levels of indebtedness, exclusion from the 
market of EU companies unable to compete, sub-optimal use of public resources and 
transfer of control over strategic assets and resources. (EC, 2020b, p. 15) 
Serbia continued to develop intense relations and strategic partnerships with a 
number of countries worldwide, including Russia, China and the US. Serbia’s 
cooperation with China increased during the COVID-19 crisis and was marked by pro-
China and EU sceptical rhetoric by high-ranking officials. (ibid., p. 16) 
EU companies are the biggest investors in the region, providing 73% of foreign direct 
investment. They are thus the main external driver of growth and jobs in the region. 
It is key to strengthen the resilience of the region to ensure the full adherence of any 
foreign-funded economic activity to EU values, norms and standards, notably in key 
areas such as the rule of law, public procurement, environment, energy, 
infrastructure and competition. (ibid., p. 15)  
The way in which the “third-party influence” is described seems to suggest that the competition 
on influence in the Western Balkans region is seen here as a zero-sum game, where any non-
European influence is a threat to EU’s standing in the region. Here, again, the EU’s unmatched 
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commitment and contribution in the region is highlighted in order to construct EU-WB6 
cooperation as the fantasmatic option for the region.  
It is critical to raise awareness in the region of the opportunities closer integration 
and reforms entail, and to tackle malign third country influence. (EC, 2020a, p. 2, 
emphasis added) 
China's business and investment activity in the Western Balkans has been on the rise 
and can in principle offer opportunities for the region; however, these investments 
very frequently neglect socio-economic and financial sustainability and EU rules on 
public procurement, and may result in high levels of indebtedness and transfer of 
control over strategic assets and resources. This means that the partner countries 
should fully implement the letter and spirit of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements with the EU and prioritise reforms in the relevant negotiation chapters 
of the accession process .(EC, 2019, p 8) 
Finally, the fantasmatic logic of progress is completed with the fantasy of fullfillment or “closure”, 
that is, closing of the accession negotiations and becoming a Member State:  
Closing negotiations: Once all closing benchmarks for all chapters have been met, 
including a credible and sustainable track record of reform implementation, notably 
on the rule of law, Member States would be in a position to agree to closing overall 
negotiations in an inter- governmental conference. This would require continued, 
irreversible progress on the reform agenda.-- Signature of the Accession Treaty: Once 
the country or countries have concluded negotiations, the Accession Treaty can be 
signed, after the opinion of the Commission, the consent of the European Parliament 
and the decision of the Council on the admission of the new Member States. --
Accession: Once the ratification of the Accession Treaty in all EU Member States and 
the acceding country or countries is completed, taking into the account the 
respective national constitutional requirements, accession could then take place.  
(EC, 2018, p. 8) 
Looking at how this end goal is described, it is interesting how it is at the same time constructed as 
a clear, logical and technical process as well as something that is so many steps away.  
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Fantasmatic logic 2:  credible vs. fragmentized EU 
Another fantasmatic logic that was clearly detectable from the material was the fantasy of the EU 
as a unified actor, one that “speaks with one voice”. As discussed earlier, this unity is seen as a 
condition for the EU to be a credible actor in the global arena. The EU’s ability to “export peace” 
and peacefully transform societies is the central idea and legitimation of the EU’s expansion, in 
addition to economic integration. On the other hand, ideal of unity is also very much about EU’s 
internal affairs: the premise for the EU’s ability to function is that its “united in diversity”.  The fear 
of polarisation and fragmentation is present in the documents. Both bilateral disputes and internal 
polarisation of the countries are seen as the dystopic counterpart of the fantasy of unified EU. This 
dystopia is projected to both the current Member States and the Western Balkan countries.   
A stronger national consensus on the overriding priority of EU integration, 
overcoming the current polarisation and demonstrating political will across party 
divides, is also necessary to sustain and consolidate the progress made by the 
country (EC, 2019, P. 16)  
Special arrangements and irrevocable commitments must also be put in place to 
ensure that new Member States are not in a position to block the accession of other 
Western Balkan candidates. (EC, 2018, p. 16) 
These fears and scepticism towards nationalism are quite expected, if one keeps in mind the 
Commission’s role to represent the interests of the whole Union vis- à-vis the member states. It 
could be even interpreted that the Commission uses the dystopia of fragmented EU to put the 
Member States in their place:  
All parties must abstain from misusing outstanding issues in the EU accession 
process. In the same vein, Member States and institutions must speak with one voice 
in the region, sending clear signals of support and encouragement, and speaking 
clearly and honestly on shortcomings when they occur. (EC, 2020a, p. 2) 
The EU’s founding myth of “overcoming history” and violent nationalism as a European fantasy—
or as an initiation ritual—is also visible:  
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All countries must unequivocally commit, in both word and deed, to overcoming the 
legacy of the past, by achieving reconciliation and solving open issues well before 
their accession to the EU, in particular border dispute. (EC, 2018, p. 17) 
The EU's enlargement policy must continue to export stability. Therefore the EU 
cannot and will not import bilateral disputes. They must be solved as a matter of 
urgency by the responsible parties. Achieving this goal will be facilitated by an 
atmosphere of good neighbourly relations, but will also be a litmus test for how 
sound these relations really are. (EC, 2018, p. 7)  
Overcoming the legacy of the past and addressing disputes arising from the conflicts 
of the 1990s remain key. Important outstanding bilateral issues still have to be 
solved—There is no place in the EU for inflammatory rhetoric or the glorification of 
war criminals, from any side. (ibid., p. 7) 
Western Balkans leaders must also show further efforts to strengthen regional 
cooperation and good neighbourly relations to bring stability and prosperity to their 
citizens, while giving confidence to the EU that the region is addressing the legacy of 
its past. (EC, 2020a, p. 2, emphasis added) 
These quotes demonstrate how the EU is here understood as a fantasmatic post-conflict space, 
one where the Western Balkan countries can only enter once they have “moved on” and resolved 
their disputes. The role of the EU is to support and oversee the peace processes from the outside 
as an expert by experience:  
The Commission will further extend support to reconciliation initiatives, including 
those that address transitional justice and seek to overcome the legacy of recent 
conflict. There will be a continuation of support for the work of Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals, and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. The 
Commission will also explore how best to further the work of International 
Committee for the Red Cross and the International Commission on Missing Persons 
in fostering regional cooperation to resolve the issue of missing persons. (EC, 2018, 
p. 15) 
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Fantasmatic logic 3: economic and regional integration  
A third important fantasmatic logic is the fantasy of regional cooperation and economic 
integration. The Western Balkans is seen as having significant “untapped” economic potential that 
can be materialised through regional integration and transformation into EU-compatible market 
economies.  
This policy approach will thus be the cornerstone of a forward-looking agenda. This 
agenda will support the transformation of the Western Balkans into functioning 
market economies able to integrate fully into the EU’s single market, to create jobs 
and entrepreneurial opportunities, to improve the business and investment climate, 
to promote the rule of law and to stop the brain drain from the region. (EC, 2020a, p. 
2)  
Regional integration is a key factor for raising living standards in the Western 
Balkans. The creation of a Regional Economic Area (REA) brings more competition 
and allows economies of scale and productivity gains. A regional market will unleash 
intra-regional trade and would make the Western Balkans a more attractive 
investment destination. Market integration based on EU rules and standards will help 
create opportunities for developing new value chains and increasing the 
attractiveness of the region for foreign direct investments, including from the EU. 
(EC, 2019, p. 7) 
The fantasy of economic integration and regional cooperation is hardly surprising: after all it is the 
other dominant narrative of European integration in addition to the EU as a peace process. 
Interestingly, however, there seems to be a logic according to which there must be at least some 
level of intra-(sub)regional integration prior to joining the EU’s internal markets. This can be seen 
in part as the EU’s attempt to make the candidate countries bear the responsibility or “take 
ownership” of economic integration. This is compatible with the idea of economic integration and 
local peace process as intertwined.  
Generally, regional cooperation cannot be imposed from outside but must be driven 
more actively by the countries of the region, which needs to take full ownership of 
efforts contributing to stability, reconciliation and increased economic opportunities.  
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--Regional cooperation should be enhanced especially on war crimes, including 
through reconciliation initiatives, such as the establishment of a regional truth 
commission. (EC, 2019, p. 9) 
However, the documents stress the EU’s contribution and role in the economic transformation of 
the region. The message seems to be that the responsibility of integration is in the hands of the 
candidate countries, but the integration and transformation should be done according to EU’s 
norms and model, as this is the only viable direction for achieving the fantasy of prosperity:  
The EU remains the main external driver of growth and jobs in the Western Balkans. 
The full adherence of any foreign economic activity to EU values, norms and 
standards is key for the region’s success (EC, 2019, p. 11) 
EU companies are the biggest investors in the region, providing 73% of foreign direct 
investment. They are thus the main external driver of growth and jobs in the region. 
It is key to strengthen the resilience of the region to ensure the full adherence of any 
foreign-funded economic activity to EU values, norms and standards, notably in key 
areas such as the rule of law, public procurement, environment, energy, 
infrastructure and competition (EC, 2020b, p. 15) 
Although the fantasy of economic cooperation is primarily marketed as beneficial to the candidate 
countries themselves, the interests of the EU and its Member countries are also transmitted in the 
documents. The Western Balkans region is seen as a lucrative market and perhaps a source of 
cheap labor force. Thus, the “untapped” potential is as much for the EU itself than for the region.  
The Western Balkans have important untapped economic potential and significant 
scope for increased intra-regional economic cooperation and trade. With a 
population of nearly 18 million people, the region is an important market for EU 
goods (EC, 2020b, p. 14, emphasis added) 
The fantasmatic logic of connectivity is linked to the fantasy of regional integration. Increasing 
connectivity is seen as a concrete way to link the Western Balkans region to the “European space” 
and to “increase the competitiveness of the continent as a whole” (EC, 2018, p. 14):  
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Enhancing connectivity within the Western Balkans represents a strategic interest for 
both sides. Increasing transport and energy connections will allow for increased 
competitiveness, economic growth and security of supply, and is at the same time an 
important prerequisite for economic integration within the Western Balkans. -- The 
Western Balkans are surrounded geographically by EU Member States and it is a 
political priority to connect infrastructure also between the EU and the Western 
Balkans and to accelerate the development of interconnected trans-European 
networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services. (EC, 2018, p. 13) 
Enhanced connectivity in transport and energy will accelerate the integration of the 
region into pan European networks, while strengthening competitive energy markets 
and developing economic corridors over the region. The Transport Community 
Treaty, which has now been ratified by all parties, will support and strengthen the 
implementation of the connectivity agenda. The creation of a digital space and of 
more integrated labour markets also offer new possibilities for youth in the region. 
(EC, 2019, pp. 7-8) 
Connectivity, in turn, is linked to another central aspect of the fantasy of economic integration, 
that of interdependency. Interestingly, interdependency within the Western Balkans and between 
the EU and the region seems to be both fantasmatic and dystopic. On the one hand, 
interdependency is part of the “virtuous circle” of enlargement and an incentive for peaceful 
cooperation:  
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the forefront the high level of market 
integration and the inter-dependence between the EU and the Western Balkans 
economies, as well as amongst the latter themselves. The Western Balkans region is 
engaged in a process of regulatory convergence with the EU. This alignment will 
allow the deepening of the Regional Economic Area (REA), turning it into a common 
regional market based on EU rules and standards. Both developments reinforce each 
other and make the region an attractive investment area. (EC, 2020b, p. 14) 
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On the other hand, it seems that the EU also considers the interdependence between the region 
and the EU as a potential threat that increases the EU’s vulnerability. This is visible especially in 
discussing migration and organised crime, where enlargement is securitised, that is, constructed as 
a matter of security:  
At the same time it is essential to further step up strategic and operational 
cooperation with the Western Balkans on migration and border management. This 
includes ensuring access to international protection, sharing of relevant information 
(such as risk analyses), enhancing border control, ensuring the effective 
implementation of readmission and return policies and the fight against irregular 
migration and migrant smuggling. Strengthening international and regional 
cooperation (including with EU agencies and the respective liaison officers in the 
region), and further consolidating border and migration management capacities is 
also necessary (EC, 2018, p. 11) 
The recently proposed New European Pact on Migration and Asylum stresses that in 
comprehensive partnerships, migration should be built in as a core issue, based on 
an assessment of the interests of the EU and its partner countries. The Western 
Balkans require a tailor-made approach, both due to their geographical location and 
to their future as an integral part of the EU: coordination can help to ensure they are 
well equipped as future Member States to respond constructively to shared 
challenges, developing their capacities and border procedures to bring them closer 
to the EU given their enlargement perspective (EC, 2020b, p. 9) 
The counter-dystopia to the fantasy of economic transformation and integration is that of 
protectionism, backwardness, unemployment, brain drain and lack of investments. This is used to 
describe the current situation in the region as well as to point out how horrific the region’s future 
will be without European integration:  
Economic development and increasing employment is essential also to stem the 
demographic challenges of the Western Balkans, with high emigration and low birth 
rates. Without stronger economies and democratic governance generally, these 
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phenomena will continue, with the associated risks of widespread disenchantment, 






While the previous chapter introduced the findings of the analysis, this chapter focuses on 
discussing the implications of these findings. This is done by reflecting and comparing how the 
analysis relates to earlier literature and the theoretical framework. The main relevance of this 
analysis was to bring the post-colonial concepts into the context of EU enlargement documents 
through post-structural analysis to understand better the EU as a postcolonial actor. This analysis 
also brought insight into how (post)colonialist discourses appear in practice, producing a certain—
yet in many parts contradictory—understanding of the enlargement process, its agents, goals and 
future. For many parts, the findings supported and complemented the earlier critical literature on 
postcolonialism, European identity and European integration that was introduced earlier. In what 
follows, I have divided the discussion points thematically into three parts. The limitations and 
shortcomings of the analysis are also discussed. 
 
6.1 The EU as a soft empire  
 
The analysis showed that both “traditional” or essentialist as well as more nuanced or ambiguous 
forms of colonial discourse could be found in the EU enlargement discourse. Starting from the 
former and looking at the material through Edward Said’s ideas of knowledge production, it 
becomes evident that enlargement policy cannot escape its postcolonial setting. According to 
Said, knowledge is always produced in a political context and for a political purpose. The 
documents are written with an assumption that they produce knowledge about the enlargement 
process and the “situation” in candidate countries in relation to EU’s standards and norms. This 
setting already presumes a certain imbalance and (post)colonial mindsets. As argued by Said in 
the context of Orientalism (1995/1978), postcolonialism in enlargement can be also seen as “a 
distribution of geopolitical awareness” or “a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases 
to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and 
novel) world” in this case the Western Balkans (p. 12) While the postcolonial position cannot be 
escaped, it can be recognized. There is no trace of such reflection in the EU enlargement policy 
papers. On the contrary, the materials normalise the enlargement as a one-directional “civilising 
mission”, where the roles of donors and receivers are strictly casted and there is a clear hierarchy 
of knowledge and value systems. The fantasmatic logic of progress is a good example of this: the 
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convergence with the EU norms is equalised with progress and prosperity, whereas failing to 
conduct reforms à la EU means that the Western Balkans are confined to their dystopic present: 
stagnation, corruption, instability and insecurity.   
 
Traditional colonial narrative is also present in how the EU itself is constructed as a unified, 
benevolent actor that promotes its superior values in the global arena and its neighborhood 
against “malign third-country influence”. Here, the ideology of the EU is perhaps most explicit and 
outspoken. The two fantasmatic pillars of European identity by Christofer Kølvraa (2016, 2018)are 
visible, that is, the expectations that European is superior and that everyone wants to be 
European (see Ch. 2 in this thesis). This attitude is crystallised in phrases such as “Ultimately, 
citizens yearn to live in countries that are prosperous and equal, where the rule of law is strong 
and corruption is rooted out.” (EC, 2018, p. 2). There seems to be a sincere belief in the EU’s 
power to transform the countries for the better and that “European experience must stand as the 
normal line of development” (Kaiwar, 2014, p. 27). The EU’s role is to “export stability” to the 
Balkans  and not to “import bilateral issues” (EC, 2018, p. 7) from the region, where conflicts are 
somehow confined. This is visible in the material in how the solutions and development models by 
the EU are framed as the only option that could provide the region with the fantasmatic future of 
progress, modernisation and democracy. The idea resonates with Ian Manner’s understanding of 
the EU as a normative power that is built on common values and promotes its values in the global 
arena, aiming to build a “new normal” in international relations (Manners 2002;2011). On the 
other hand, the expectation of superiority can be seen as the fantasmatic fuel and the 
legitimation for pursuing geopolitical interests and fighting “third country influence” in the 
Western Balkans region. This supports the claim of the critics of the Mannersian normative power 
approach, who argue that the discourse of the EU as a normative power disguises its 
“imperialist/neo-colonial pretensions” (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021). Based on my own analysis, both 
intentions are present in the enlargement policy documents. This finding supports the notion of 
the EU enlargement as an example of EU’s” stability-democracy dilemma”, continuous balancing 
between stabilising the region and supporting democratic values (Smith et al. 2019). 
 
The findings of the analysis are also compatible with Jan Zielonka’s theory of the EU as a modern 
type of empire that needs both internal and external legitimation to survive (Zielonka, 2013). The 
social logic of the virtuous circle of enlargement is perhaps the clearest example of this: 
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enlargement politics is supposed to benefit everyone. This logics of virtuous circle can be seen as 
an example Joseph Nye’s (2002)soft power, whereby countries are not forced but persuaded to 
obey. In reality, the enlargement politics seems to be more about soft imperialism or “soft power 
applied in a hard way” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005), since the candidate countries are not given 
any choice but to obey if they wish to avoid a dystopic future. In this sense, the enlargement 
discourse is a discourse of necessity that by leaving no valid alternatives attempts to fix itself as 
hegemonic and cover over the contingency of social reality. In this discourse, the candidate 
countries are not included in negotiations about their own future but their agency is in 
implementation of the EU acquis. From this perspective, the definition of soft imperialism by 
Hettne & Söderbaum (2005) sounds very accurate: it is “an asymmetric form of dialogue or even 
the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest 
rather than for the creation of a genuine (interregional) dialogue” (p. 5).  
 
The documents go into detail in arguing for the enlargement agenda. This is of course typical in 
any decision-making process that seeks legitimation: the relevance of policies has to be explained. 
But the persuasive style of the documents also suggests that there is demand for explanations 
and convincing. Although the need to carry on with the enlargement agenda is presented as an 
existential necessity for the Union, the need to prove it might be a sign that not everyone agrees 
with it. This way, enlargement policy documents can be seen as defending the enlargement 
agenda in the more general discussion of European integration, where the need for further 
enlargement is questioned. This defensive becomes more understandable, if we consider the 
recent developments in the enlargement politics: besides the continuous enlargement fatique, 
the enlargement agenda has recently become more and more contested (Bélanger & 
Schimmelfennig, 2021) and resisted (Economides, 2020).  
 
 
6.2 Blurred lines  
 
In addition to more recognizable and traditional post-colonialist and imperial mentalities, the 
analysis also supported the notion that more particular and nuanced concepts and theories are 
needed to understand different forms of postcolonialism in EU’s enlargement politics towards the 
Western Balkans. This is where the critique of Balkanism and the more recent interpretations of 
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Europe and its Others proved to be fruitful. In the material, the Western Balkans is not seen as the 
absolute Other but rather as a “lesser” Europe that exists in relation to the “real” Europe. As 
pointed out by Merje Kuus (2004), the Western Balkans is “not simply backward, but a learner, an 
experiment and a testing ground” (p. 474). Indeed, many parts of the material represented a 
more ambiguous understanding of the border between Europe and non-Europe.  
 
The most interesting discovery in this regard was the material’s contradictory style that caused 
ambiguity. This is what I have called the discursive double move. In the empirical material, 
contradiction appeared in many forms. Perhaps the most distinguishable of these was the 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion as a political logic. As discussed in the analysis, placing the 
Western Balkans both inside and outside Europe, constructing the region as homogenic and 
diverse, interdependent and independent, blurred the lines between Europe and non-Europe. In 
contrast to essentialist dichotomies, this finding reminds of Homi Bhabha’s (1995) concept of 
hybrid space, where the ambivalence of colonialist discourse stems from coloniser’s paradoxical 
relation to the colonized. Furthermore, the finding resonates well with the idea of multilayered 
Europe that was developed in the works of Merje Kuus (2007) and Ole Wæver (2001). Indeed, this 
analysis supports their argument that the division between Europe and non-Europe is constructed 
as a continuum or a paradox rather than a dichotomy. Borrowing Rainer Hülsse’s concept, the 
enlargement process appeared in this material dominantly through a path metaphor: in the 
documents, candidate countries were neither completely out or in, but somewhere on their way 
to Europe. The idea of multilayered Europe also resonates with the political logics of agency and 
the social logics of the EU as a choice, for it highlights the agency and responsibility of the 
candidate countries in choosing the right path and fullfilling their European perspective.   
 
However, finding contradictions and ambiguity from the material does not mean that they are 
consciously produced. From this perspective, the double move can be interpreted as a 
consequence of an attempt to compromise between diverse opinions. Still, the question of 
intentionality does not take away the effect of the double move, which contributes to ambiguity 
on where the Western Balkan countries stand in relation to the EU. This confusion is certainly felt 
in candidate countries where the uncertainty and continuous delays have been decreasing the 
credibility of the European project (Latal, 2020). As this criticism has not been very effective in 
changing the Commission’s tone, it begs the question of whether some actors within the EU do 
 88 
not see the stagnation and uncertainty as problematic. Indeed, as long as the Western Balkan 
countries are committed to their “European path”, the region can work as buffer zone for the EU 
that keeps the aspiring candidates on hold. Based on the documents, the EU does not always 
consider that this is necessarily so bad for the candidate countries: it is many times highlighted 
how the process itself already benefits the candidates. Although the die-hard pro-EU actors in the 
region are not happy to be left in a waiting room, leaders of the region can benefit from such in-
betweenness. As argued by Katalin Miklóssy and Hanna Smith (2019), in-betweenness can open 
new room for maneuvering for the leaders who can make different partners to compete for 
loyalty and influence. Serbia, for example, has used its position to practice “multi-vector foreign 
policy” by balancing between the EU, Russia and China. (Ponomareva, 2020). From this 
perspective, it is not so clear that the ambiguity only works to construct and renew the power 
imbalance between the EU and the Western Balkans region. As proposed by Homi Bhabha, the 
ambiguity and instability of colonial discourse reveals its contingency and opens space for 
counter-hegemonic narratives (Prasad, 2004, p. 21).  
 
Indeed, recent years have proved that the appeal of the EU might not be as strong and dominant 
as the EU has believed. The realisation of real competition of ”the hearts and minds” in the region 
is visible in the material. The social logic of the EU as a choice demands for firmer commitment to 
the accession process by the candidate countries. It can also be understood as a counter-act to 
recent feelings of ambiguity in enlargement and to the multi-vectoral policies that it has enabled. 
Perhaps the fear of third-country influence is also one reason why there is no sign of any 
intermediate solution besides being a full member, some kind of “membership light”. This is of 
course connected to a wider debate on European Integration and the potential different forms of 
multi-speed integration. Fear of losing the Western Balkans is visible i.e.in the following quotation 
already cited in analysis:  
 
 There can be no ambiguity by leaders about where the Western Balkans belong and 
the direction in which they are heading. This is necessary to secure and sustain the 
support of their own and of EU citizens, and must be reflected in leaders’ 
communications and outreach to citizens. (EC, 2018, p. 3)  
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 The volatile loyalties have clearly become a threat to EU’s interests, to the credibility of the 
enlargement process and to the EU itself. Combined with the perceived threat of geopolitical 
competition, it could be argued that the EU has ended up damaging its own interests by 
producing ambiguity regarding Western Balkan’s standing in relation to the EU. This points out 
one paradox of colonialism developed by Bhabha (1995): while the non-west (the Balkans) is seen 
as weak and incompetent, it is also identified as a threat capable of challenging the whole 
“credibility” of the EU. The sanction mechanism embedded in the new enlargement methodology 
can be seen as a response to this realization, as it sanctions the candidate countries for 
stagnation. It can be also seen as a response to the EU’s internal developments and the increasing 
polarisation between different interpretations of Europeanness. In the material, the fantasmatic 
logics of united EU vs polarised EU clearly reflects these fears.  
 
6.3 Dislocation  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, the ideological nature of discourse can be analysed by looking at 
how moments of dislocation are reacted to. This draws attention to whether the contingent and 
open nature of social reality is recognised or whether it is only the substance that is contested. 
The introduction of new enlargement methodology (EC, 2020a) clearly represented a potential 
moment of dislocation, as its purpose was to contest the way in which enlargement politics is 
done. Based on this analysis, it can be argued that the response for this potential dislocation is 
ideological rather than ethical, since contestation is only directed to the substance and 
technicalities of the policies, not the assumptions that they were built upon.  This is evident for 
example in how the “political nature of the [enlargement] process” is understood in the new 
enlargement methodology, as discussed in Chapter 5.3 (pp. 74-75).  
 
 It could be even said that the policies are presented in a way that excludes the possibility of 
ethical response, that is, a deeper contestation and reflection of the normative framework of 
enlargement politics. Thus, it can be argued that it works in covering over the radical contingency 
and the new possibilities for identification it could open. In practice, this could mean for example 
re-thinking the institutionalised imbalances between the EU and the candidate countries in the 
accession process. This way, the lack of ethical response contributes to sustaining and normalising 
the different colonialist discourses in enlargement policy. This observation stresses the 
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importance of approaching enlargement politics from a critical perspective as a practice in a 
(post)colonial space.  
 
6.4 Limitations   
 
While this analysis brought interesting insight to the research topic, it also had its limitations in 
responding to the research question. First, as this analysis had a theoretical starting point, it 
naturally directed me to look for confirmation for the theoretical framework. In this way, the 
analysis is never fully “open” and cannot provide objective information or answer to the research 
question, as discussed in the chapter 4.1 about epistemology. While this does not make the 
research any less relevant, it should be kept in mind while estimating the findings.   
 
As for the method, it is challenging to estimate whether the division into three logics provided any 
analytical value. While the three logics and the aiding concepts worked as useful clues in analysing 
the empirical material, the attempt to identify them sometimes felt counter intuitive to the 
research task. In looking for the different logics from the material, it was also challenging to set 
the focus and level of analysis: whether to concentrate on individual phrases and choices of 
words, more structural elements, or the context of the material. The result of this uncertainty is 
visible in the analysis as a lack of strict focus. As the logics approach only represents one way of 
doing post-structuralist discourse analysis, some other approach would have certainly directed 
attention to different aspects of the material.   
 
 The empirical material also set some limitations. First, the scope of this thesis limited the number 
of documents that was possible to include in this analysis. This limits the analysis to only recent 
developments in enlargement politics and prevents me from the kind of credibility and that 
longitudinal analysis of a longer period could provide. Working with a small set of data, individual 
observations can get disproportionate importance. More material might have provided me with a 
better understanding on how specific these findings are for this particular time period. The 
material is also limited in what it can tell about the social reality of enlargement politics and the 
diversity of different opinions that form the policies. Focusing solely on Commission’s 
enlargement policy documents, there is no way to tell a) what do these documents represent and 
b) what are their implications for enlargement politics as a practice, whether they are these just 
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ceremonial declarations.  A more diverse set of data combined with i.e., interviews from people 
who work with enlargement politics could help in putting these documents into context and to 
see if the findings are specific for this type of material. To get a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon, it would have also been interesting to investigate the 
different national narratives on enlargement which surely influence EU’s enlargement policy 
through European Council. 
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7. Conclusions: fifty shades of postcolonialism  
  
This thesis has aimed to answer the question: (how) is EU’s enlargement policy postcolonial? The 
research question stemmed from an urge to understand the normative background of 
enlargement politics. Based on earlier literature, enlargement was framed as a policy process in 
the intersection between the EU’s internal and external issues. Recent studies showed how 
enlargement is—amongst other things—about transforming the EU’s self-other relations. As this 
thesis argues that these relations cannot be understood independently of the colonial roots of the 
European project, different postcolonial theories provided a useful toolkit to critically assess the 
enlargement discourse. Building on Edward Said’s Orientalism (1995/1978), this thesis understood 
(post)colonialism as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan 
center ruling a distant territory” (p. 9). Thus, colonialism is produced in the interplay between the 
material and the discursive. To understand the ways in which colonialism might be visible in 
enlargement politics, this thesis used post-structuralist discourse theory (PDT) and the logics 
approach in particular to study the different assumptions embedded in enlargement discourse.  
 
The analysis showed that there are many elements, discourses and assumptions that reflect 
different (post)colonial mentalities and power relations. It also demonstrated the diversity of the 
forms in which colonialism can play out in practice. Instead of one, consistent and omnipresent 
colonialism, this thesis suggests that it is more fruitful to talk about colonialisms in plural. 
Although colonialism manifests itself in different ways, these manifestations share a 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance, (post)colonial logics that can be recognized thanks to the 
variety of existing post-colonialist theories and concepts. Enlargement and the EU’s relation to the 
Western Balkans emerged from the material as somewhat paradoxical, preliminary supporting 
Homi Bhabha’s notion of the ambivalence in colonial discourse. Based on these findings, further 
research could investigate the applicability of Bhabha’s concepts in EU’s relation to its Others. 
 
Finally, the analysis showed how colonialism is not about individual “colonialist” elements or 
actions but rather an institutionalised way of doing things that normalizes power imbalance 
between the EU and the Western Balkans. Enlargement policy produces Europeanness as 
something that can be evaluated against certain institutionalized norms. In the accession process, 
Western Balkan countries are positioned within this framework, reducing complex societies into 
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something that can be managed, evaluated, governed and educated (Said, 1993, p. 41). However, 
this is not to say that enlargement is an evil colonialist plot, but rather to underline that colonialist 
assumptions are a sedimented part of how the world is seen in EU’s enlargement policy. 
Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention and question these ways in which (post)colonialisms 
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